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PREFACE
The Public Oversight Board (the "Board") was created in 1977 by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA") to oversee and report on the Peer Review Program for firms that audit 
publicly held entities. The program is administered by the SEC Practice 
Section of the Division for CPA Firms. The SEC Practice Section is gov­
erned, in turn, by an Executive Committee composed of volunteer profes­
sionals. The Peer Review Program is directed by the Peer Review 
Committee, also composed of volunteers. Peer reviews of members are 
performed by firms or groups of auditors who are hired by the member 
firms to be reviewed and who report to such member firms the results of 
their reviews.
Since the peer review process is performed and administered by 
auditors, the AICPA determined that public confidence would be in­
creased by creation of an independent oversight board composed of 
"prominent individuals of high integrity and reputation." The Board was 
created to perform that oversight function and to assure that the Peer Re­
view Program is carried out in a manner consistent with the public inter­
est. The Board's first chairman was John J. McCloy, one of the great 
Americans of this century, who epitomized the "high integrity and repu­
tation" sought in Board members.
The Board's independence is evidenced by its power to select the 
successors of its members, hire and compensate its staff, set the compensa­
tion of its members, and choose the Board's chairman.
The Board's principal functions are: (1) to oversee the operation of 
the Peer Review Program; and (2) to oversee the activities of the Quality 
Control Inquiry Committee (the "QCIC"). The QCIC was established in 
1979 to review the practice quality implications of lawsuits alleging de­
fects in the audits of publicly held entities.
The staff of the Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") regularly reviews the Board's files to determine 
whether the peer review and the QCIC programs are being properly con­
ducted and properly overseen by the Board. The SEC staff's conclusions 
are reflected in the Commission's annual reports which have stated that 
the SEC Practice Section's programs have increased the reliability of 
audits. In addition, the Board itself meets from time to time with the SEC 
commissioners. The Board routinely makes recommendations for im­
provement in the peer review and QCIC programs. The Board also pub­
lishes an annual report "and such other reports as may be deemed 
necessary with respect to its activities."
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Over time the Board has gone beyond the oversight of the peer re­
view and QCIC programs because it felt that the public and the profession 
would be ill served if these programs functioned flawlessly while other 
forces eroded public confidence in the profession and the services it per­
forms. Thus, the Board and its members have included commentary in 
annual reports, given speeches and written articles, testified before con­
gressional committees and commissioned special studies on matters bear­
ing directly on the integrity of the audit process.
Robert K. Mautz, Vice Chairman
Melvin R. Laird
Robert F. Froehlke
March 5 , 1993
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REPORT OF THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD ON 
ISSUES CONFRONTING THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
INTRODUCTION
Representatives of a number of accounting firms requested that the Public Oversight Board (the ''Board") consider whether it could sup­port the accounting profession's efforts to obtain relief from what 
the profession believes to be an excessive burden of litigation. The Board 
agreed to consider the request and to determine whether such litigation 
was adversely affecting the public interest.
The Board had already been concerned with the extent and impact of 
litigation and the influence of publicized allegations, litigation settlements 
and judgments on the public perception of the accounting profession and 
its performance. Attacks on the accounting profession from a variety of 
sources suggested a significant public concern with the profession's per­
formance. Of particular moment is the widespread belief that auditors 
have a responsibility for detecting management fraud which they are not 
now meeting. The Board could not ignore these signs of failing public 
confidence in public accountants and auditing. A general loss of confi­
dence in the audit function would pose severe problems for our credit 
economy.
The Board believes that the integrity and reliability of audited finan­
cial statements are critical to the American economy. Management, inves­
tors, creditors and government agencies make decisions of enormous 
magnitude in reliance upon such statements. Roughly half of a trillion 
dollars was invested in or loaned to corporations last year. A substantial 
portion of those funds were used to finance the expansion and improve­
ment of production facilities. Decisions about the ways in which funds 
are committed are made on the basis of financial information available to 
management. Investors and creditors provide funds on the basis of the 
same information. Without the auditor's opinion, investors and creditors 
would have to rely on the unverified —  and possibly self-serving —  state­
ments of those seeking the funds. The quality and value of that opinion 
are clearly debased when management fraud and illegalities go unde­
tected.
Trustworthy, quality audits are essential to the efficient allocation of 
resources in our capitalistic society, and the detection of management 
fraud and illegal conduct is equally essential to this society. Because of 
these facts and the Board's belief that implementation of the recommenda­
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INTRODUCTION
tions in this Report will improve the usefulness and reliability of financial 
statements and the ability of auditors to detect fraud and illegalities, the 
Board urges that the recommendations in this Report receive careful con­
sideration and quick implementation.
Basis for the Recom m endations in this Report
Board members have become familiar with the profession and its prob­
lems during their aggregate of forty-five years membership on the Public 
Oversight Board. During those years, the Board has met with literally 
hundreds of members of the profession, including its leaders, for the ex­
press purpose of discussing the effectiveness of the self-regulatory pro­
gram and the quality of the profession's performance. Board members 
have also met frequently with government officials who have an interest 
in auditing matters and the accounting profession. This includes the 
chairmen and commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the "SEC"), its chief accountants, the Comptroller General of the United 
States, the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and 
ranking staff members of congressional committees. In preparing this Re­
port, Board members held special meetings with some of those who had 
been most helpful in the past and with others knowledgeable about the 
accounting profession and its current performance.
Scope o f this Report
Although discussions with representatives of the profession and some of 
its critics revealed a wide range of matters that warranted attention, the 
examination of these matters is organized under a limited number of 
broad topics. First, the Board turned its attention to what has been fre­
quently referred to as the "litigation crisis." Chapter I focuses on the 
Board's inquiry into the extent of the litigation crisis, its causes, its present 
and potential impact on the accounting profession, and its remedies.
In Chapter II, the Board turns its attention to the accounting profes­
sion's present self-regulatory program for accounting firms, its genesis, 
constituent activities, and documented success. Because that program has 
not been without critics, the report includes a description of some alterna­
tive regulatory proposals and evaluates such proposals as possible re­
placements for the existing program.
In Chapter III, the Board sets forth a number of recommendations to 
make self-regulation more effective by assuring that any lessons to be 




Although litigation and some of the recent settlements and judg­
ments resulting therefrom have contributed significantly to the current 
erosion of public confidence in accounting and auditing, the Board is con­
vinced that more than alleged audit failures has influenced the public's 
present perception of independent public accountants and widened the 
"expectation gap." Chapter IV includes recommendations for changes in 
standards to make financial statements and audit reports more under­
standable and useful.
Chapter V proposes a number of recommendations for improving 
and strengthening the profession's performance by enhancing its capacity 
and willingness to detect fraud, strengthening professionalism and inde­
pendence and improving financial reporting.
3
CHAPTER I
TH E L ITIGATION CRISIS
This chapter discusses the existing litigation crisis, together with 
the Board's views on the need for litigation reform.
The last decade has seen an explosion of litigation in the United States. Much of this litigation has involved accounting firms.When a client company and its management are sued because of al­
leged fraud or other misfeasance on the part of management or faulty fi­
nancial statements, the auditor is commonly named, along with the client 
company, the company's officers and directors, underwriters, counsel for 
the client and others. Allegations that in auditing the financial statements 
of a client company auditors failed in performing their common law or 
statutory duties have become commonplace. Not infrequently, a number 
of the other defendants are bankrupt or have modest assets, with the re­
sult that the accounting firm is the only defendant to whom the plaintiffs 
can look for monetary redress.
Even if these actions are dismissed before trial —  as many are —  the 
cost of pursuing a case to dismissal is often very high. In many cases the 
high cost of pursuing litigation makes a settlement, including on occa­
sions, the payment of damages even when no audit failure may have oc­
curred, both reasonable and economically attractive.
Need for a Lim iting Principle
The history of accountant litigation has been characterized by a constant 
search for a principle that would limit the universe of circumstances in 
which an auditor should be liable. In our society, the auditor's opinion 
has tremendous commercial importance and is relied upon heavily in fi­
nancially huge transactions. Hence, the damages traceable to an alleged 
accounting or auditing error can be of great financial consequence. The 
auditor's opinion is often circulated and relied upon by many more than 
those to whom it was directed and for whose use it was intended. The 
monetary benefit which accrues to accountants is minuscule in relation to 
the liability which can be imposed if there is no reasonable limiting princi­
ple.
In the landmark case, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 
1931), decided by the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in 
New York State), Benjamin Cardozo, the brilliant jurist then serving as
5
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chief justice of that court (and who later served as a Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court), clearly recognized the consequences of extending 
the liability of auditors too far:
A different question develops when we ask whether [the auditors] 
owed a duty to [creditors and investors of the auditor's client] to 
make [the audit] without negligence. If liability for negligence ex­
ists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or 
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose ac­
countants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeter­
minate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business 
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt 
whether a flaw may not exist in the implications of a duty that ex­
poses to these consequences (emphasis added).
For many years, "privity" was the limiting principle which protected 
the auditor from ruinous liability. That principle, which generally re­
quires that the auditor have had a contractual relationship with the plain­
tiff or that the plaintiff have been the specifically intended user of the 
financial statements, has been eroded by many courts. It is noteworthy, 
however, that recently the Supreme Court in California, where lower 
courts had perhaps done the most to undercut the force of privity, af­
firmed its commitment to this principle in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 
P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
The Federal Securities Acts
The advent of the federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934 created dra­
matic new liability risks to auditors. The Securities Act of 1933 provided 
that auditors whose opinions on financial statements were filed as parts of 
registration statements in connection with public offerings were liable for 
the damage suffered by investors attributable to misstatements or omis­
sions in the financial statements on which they opined unless they had, af­
ter reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe, and did 
believe, that the financial statements did not contain a material misstate­
ment or omit any statement necessary to make the financial statements not 
misleading.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 exposed auditors to additional 
liability, though the threshold of liability is somewhat higher than under 
the 1933 Act. While other sections of that Act create some liability expo­
sure for auditors, the principal basis for asserting auditor liability has been 
section 10(b). Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 under it make it unlawful, 
among other things, for any person to buy or sell a security through
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fraudulent or deceptive means or by making an untrue statement of mate­
rial fact or omitting to state a material fact." Aiding and abetting" a viola­
tion of rule 10b-5 is also actionable.1
The United States Supreme Court, in a landmark case involving a 
major accounting firm, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), 
decided that for a person to be liable under rule 10b-5, it had to be shown 
that the person had knowingly violated the rule. Subsequent courts of ap­
peal cases extended liability to situations in which the defendant acted 
with recklessness tantamount to a knowing wrongdoing.
Typically, an auditor's liability under rule 10b-5 is based upon the al­
legation that in stating its opinion that the financial statements fairly pre­
sent the financial position and the results of operations of an entity in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") and 
in stating that its audit was conducted in accordance with generally ac­
cepted auditing standards, the auditor either knowingly or recklessly 
made a material misstatement.
Reasons fo r Concern in the Accounting Profession
There are several reasons for the accounting profession's extremely high 
level of concern with auditors' exposure to liability. First, there has been a 
significant increase in the number of cases charging misstatements of finan­
cial information by corporations and in the amount of damages sought. 
When a corporation announces a substantial write-off or other material ad­
verse event, when its stock price drops dramatically or when its earnings 
drop sharply, it is commonplace for multiple suits to be filed, often within 
hours or days of the event, well before any sort of searching inquiry could be 
conducted. These suits, which routinely name the auditors as defendants, 
generally charge that the audited financial statements should have reflected 
the event or information that allegedly caused investor losses.
Second, a number of multi-million dollar judgments have been ren­
dered in recent years against accounting firms, and a number of very sub­
stantial settlements have been made, sometimes out of fear of 
unreasonable verdicts. Notable among these judgments are last year's 
$338 million dollar jury verdict in Arizona against a major accounting firm 
(the case has been ordered to be retried) and a verdict in the amount of 
$204 million against a major accounting firm awarded by a jury in
TH E LITIGATION CRISIS
1 Aiding and abetting liability under rule 10b-5 generally requires (1) a primary 
violation by another, (2) knowledge of the primary violation by the aider and 
abettor, and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor.
7
Galveston, Texas (settled for an estimated $45 million). A summary of the 
latter case illustrates the excesses of this kind of litigation.
The plaintiffs in the action, investors who had bought about $18 
million in Miniscribe bonds sold in 1987, were awarded $20 mil­
lion in actual damages and $530 million in punitive damages. Of 
these amounts, $4 million in compensatory and $200 million in 
punitive damages were levied against Coopers & Lybrand . . . . 2
Third, at least one important, second-tier accounting firm has been 
bankrupted by, among other things, the extensive liabilities which 
stemmed from litigation. The partnership's assets and insurance were in­
sufficient to satisfy all claims allowed in its bankruptcy, with the result 
that some individual partners were reported to have been required to con­
tribute over $500,000 each toward the settlement of claims.3
Fourth, leaders of the accounting profession have expressed concern 
that, as a consequence of litigation liabilities, one or more of the major 
firms may be rendered insolvent with devastating consequences, not only 
for the partners and employees of the failed firm, but also for the profes­
sion as a whole and indeed for the public interest as well. These leaders of 
the profession point to the impact such an event would have on the will­
ingness of partners in other firms to continue to pursue their careers ex­
posed to such liability dangers, the difficulties of recruiting outstanding 
persons into a profession so imperilled, the complications which would be 
posed for clients of the failed firm in satisfying the SEC requirements that 
financial statements filed annually be audited by independent account­
ants, and a host of other extremely damaging consequences which would 
flow from such an event.4
TH E LITIGATION CRISIS
2 Paul Geoghan, Punitive Damages: A Storm Over the Accounting Profession, J. 
Acct., July 1992, at 47 (emphasis added).
3 L&H: The Grim Realty, Pub. Acct. Rep., May 31, 1992, at 4. Laventhol and 
Horwath, then the seventh largest accounting firm in the United States, was forced 
into bankruptcy in large measure because of a staggering $2 billion in liability 
claims and the resulting cost of defending against the lawsuits. The former 
partners agreed to pay $48 million as part of the liquidation of the firm in order to 
avoid personal bankruptcy.
4 Arthur Andersen & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG Peat 
Marwick & Price Waterhouse, The Liability Crisis in the United States: Impact on 
the Accounting Profession, A Statement of Position 3-5 (Aug. 6, 1992), in J. Acct., 
Nov. 1992, at 21-24.
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The Board’s View o f the Need for Litigation Reform
The Board has examined the evidence available on the liability exposure 
of the accounting profession. It has examined that exposure from the 
standpoints of fundamental fairness, the future development of the pro­
fession and the preservation of a sound accounting profession. From all 
these perspectives, it has concluded that the public interest requires reme­
dial legislation.
The Board believes that, apart from the danger of the collapse of one 
or more major firms —  which it does not take lightly —  the litigation risks 
confronting the profession pose serious dangers to its ability to perform 
its assigned role in society. While no systematic study appears to have 
been made, there is ample anecdotal evidence that the liability threat is a 
factor students are now taking into account in determining whether to 
pursue a career in public accounting. There have been instances of prom­
ising young managers refusing partnership in accounting firms because of 
concerns with exposing their personal assets to litigation risks. There 
have also been instances in which these concerns were important factors 
in the decision of partners to leave public accounting for corporate posi­
tions. These are reasonable and expectable responses to the highly publi­
cized risks of becoming a partner in an accounting firm.
The litigation liability danger directly affects the public, as well as 
the profession, in other ways; for example, the profession is increasingly 
reluctant to provide assurances on forward-looking financial data or other 
"soft information" that would be of benefit to the capital markets.5 There 
is a flood of other types of financial information which is becoming in­
creasingly available to users of financial information. The accounting pro­
fession has the expertise and the objectivity to provide assurances to the 
public regarding many of the new types of information. The profession 
would be more inclined to provide these assurances if the "Damocles 
Sword" of excessive liability claims did not hang over it.
Moreover, since many of the suits result from the failure of small 
companies, firms are reportedly refusing to undertake the audits of such 
companies because of the higher risks associated with such audits. This 
poses a grave problem because it severely hampers the access of such 
companies to the credit and equity markets. This could significantly ham­
per the ability of small companies to grow, create jobs and develop imagi-
TH E LITIGATION CRISIS
5 The management's discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of 
operations as required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K, financial forecasts and 
information about compliance with laws are examples of such information.
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native products and services, all of which would be a severe national det­
riment, since small companies created more than half of all new jobs in the 
last decade.
Apart from these considerations, and transcending them, there is the 
question of fairness. In many instances, the role of the auditor in relation 
to a fraud is peripheral. It is noteworthy how very few are the instances in 
which a certified public accountant has knowingly and deliberately given 
a false opinion or participated in a client's misdeeds. A typical pattern is 
for an executive and one or more conspirators within a company to perpe­
trate a cunning fraud carefully designed to be concealed, not only from 
colleagues within the company, but also from its auditor.6
In another typical scenario, the financial statements are prepared by 
management using liberal interpretations of permissible accounting prac­
tices. The auditor, unable to point convincingly to prohibitions against 
the use of the alternative interpretation chosen by management, gives its 
honest opinion that the statements fairly present the financial position and 
the results of operations of the entity in conformity with GAAP. Then, 
when the company fails or suffers a setback, these honest judgments are 
transmuted into grossly overdrawn charges.
In these situations, and in innumerable others, it is unfair to put the 
entire onus upon the auditor. Auditors should be accountable for their 
conduct and they should bear responsibility for the consequences of their 
legal failings and shortcomings; however, they should not be responsible 
or accountable for the shortcomings of others. A system that would allo­
cate financial responsibility among those involved in a financial failure or 
in financial misdeeds in proportion to the responsibility of each for losses 
suffered by investors and creditors would, in the estimation of the Board, 
be fairer and more compatible with the American sense of justice than is
TH E LITIGATION CRISIS
6 AU Section 316.07 states; "Because of the characteristics of irregularities, 
p articu larly  those involving forgery and collusion, a properly designed and 
executed audit may not detect a material irregularity. For example, generally 
accepted auditing standards do not require that an auditor authenticate documents, 
nor is the auditor trained to do so. Also, audit procedures that are effective for 
detecting a misstatement that is unintentional may be ineffective for a misstatement 
that is intentional and is concealed through collusion between client personnel and 
third parties or among management or employees of the client." 1 Codification of 
Professional Standards, U.S. Auditing Standards (AICPA) § 316.07, at 245-2 (Jan. 
1992).
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the present system, which can result in the full monetary loss being borne 
by a relatively minor participant.
Proposed Legislative Reform s
Much of the risk to the accounting profession derives from the fact that its 
responsibility is "joint and several"  with other named defendants. An al­
ternative to the familiar "joint and several" liability is "separate and pro­
portionate" liability as a basis for allocating damages. This is the standard 
urged by the profession and others. Under "joint and several," each de­
fendant can be held liable for the full loss suffered by the plaintiffs. Thus, 
if the only defendant with insurance protection or substantial assets is the 
accounting firm, it may be held liable for the damages caused by each of 
the parties even though the losses suffered may be mainly the result of 
economic events or the wrongdoing of others. Under a "separate and pro­
portionate" formulation, the trier of fact determines the proportion of the 
loss caused by each defendant and allocates the damages among the de­
fendants based on that determination. Thus, for instance, if the trier of 
fact determined that only 20% of a loss was caused by the failure of the 
auditor to perform a proper audit, then th e damages payable by the audi­
tor would be only 20% of the aggregate damages.
The main thrust of the profession's efforts for legislative refor m is di­
rected toward Congress even though most claims are made under state 
laws. A few states have adopted the "separate and proportionate" assess­
ment of damages, but most have not. Because the practices of many ac­
counting firms cross state lines, the "separate and proportionate" 
formulation must apply to state as well as federal claims to be effective. 
Since securing relief in a sufficient number of states would probably prove 
to be excessively difficult, federal preemptive legislation should be 
sought.
The legislation proposed by the profession, which was introduced in 
the 102nd Congress and has been reintroduced in the present Congress, 
contains, in addition to the "separate and proportionate" reform, other 
provisions that shift the prevailing party's attorneys' fees to the losing 
party (as is generally done in the United Kingdom) and that eliminate sev­
eral litigation practices seen as abusive. The Board observes that there are 
a number of complex public policy implications in these other proposals 
which need to be evaluated in the broader context of tort reform and 
hence expresses no opinion on them.
In addition, the profession should continue to press for reform of the 
civil liability provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi­
T h e  l it ig a t io n  c r is is
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zations Act ("RICO") of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act. These 
provisions, which create the danger of treble damages in virtually all cases 
charging auditors with violations of the federal securities laws, create un­
warranted pressures on defendants to settle claims which might otherwise 
be litigated to a successful conclusion for the defendants. The RICO pro­
visions have created a powerful tool which plaintiffs' attorneys use suc­
cessfully to secure settlements in excess of what would otherwise be 
justified.
The RICO civil liability provisions have been extended by courts well 
beyond the very real problem of organized criminal activity that led to 
their enactment. Congress should amend the RICO civil liability provi­
sions to eliminate their application to actions under the federal securities 
laws.
Let there be no misunderstanding: The Board's advocacy of the re­
forms discussed above should not be construed to mean the Board does 
not believe accountants and their firms should be responsible civilly and, 
in those rare cases where the circumstances indicate criminal conduct, 
criminally, for their conduct. The Board believes that the existence of civil 
remedies for misconduct in connection with professional activity is both 
fair and appropriate as a powerful inducement to professionals to adhere 
to proper standards of conduct.
T h e  l it ig a t io n  c r is is
RECOMMENDATION I-1:
Financial responsibility among those involved in a financial failure 
or in fraudulent financial reporting should be allocated in propor­
tion to responsibility for losses suffered. Accordingly, "separate 
and proportionate" liability legislation applicable to both federal 
and state claims should be enacted by Congress. The civil liability 
provisions of RICO should be amended to eliminate treble dam­
ages in cases that arise under the federal securities laws.
Incorporation  o f Accounting Firm s
The partnership mode of accounting practice became common at about 
the turn of the century. It was chosen to assure clients and others that the 
partners in accounting firms were financially committed to the integrity of 
their work. This kind of commitment was commendable and reasonable 
in a time when partners in even the largest firms knew each other. The
12
time is long past when this sort of knowledge is possible. This form of or­
ganization for the profession is obsolete and should be discarded.
The membership of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants (the "AICPA") has modified its Code of Professional Conduct 
to permit firms to practice in corporate or quasi-corporate form, which 
would limit the liability of partners not at fault in a deficient audit to the 
amount of their investment in the firm. The Board believes it is important 
for firms in the profession to be permitted to practice accountancy in a 
corporate or quasi-corporate form that preserves the liability of an indi­
vidual partner for his or her derelictions, but does not visit the conse­
quences upon other partners. The financial security and well-being of the 
officers of, say, General Electric are not imperilled by the misdeed of one 
of their number. There is no more reason why all partners in modem  
multi-national accounting firms, which often count their partners in the 
thousands, should be in peril because of the laxity or incompetence of one 
of their number.
As matters now stand, the AICPA's amendment to its Code of Pro­
fessional Conduct, to be effective, must be implemented by state action 
permitting the corporate or quasi-corporate form of organization. Secur­
ing approval in fifty states for firms to practice in a corporate or quasi-cor­
porate form will be time consuming and difficult. Therefore, the Board 
believes this is a situation where Congress should adopt preemptive legis­
lation that authorizes accounting firms to incorporate or to become lim­
ited liability companies under federal law. The legislation should provide 
that accountants organized under the federal statute could not be barred 
from practicing in states that do not allow a structure which limits recov­
ery to the assets of the firm, the available liability insurance and the assets 
of the errant professionals involved. The objective is to get innocent part­
ners' personal assets out of harm's way.
T h e  l it ig a t io n  c r is is
RECOMMENDATION I-2:
Congress should adopt preemptive legislation to permit the prac­
tice of accountancy in a form that appropriately limits the liability 
of individual members of the firm.
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CHAPTER I
ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC  PRACTICE SECTION’S 
SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAMS
This chapter provides background material about the SEC Practice 
Section's programs, an assessment o f their effectiveness and a 
recommendation to assure that auditors o f all SEC 
registrants are subject to peer review.
Critics of the accounting profession have not spared the self-regula­tory program for accounting firms overseen by the Board. Some ar­gue that the major fault of the present program is that it does not 
identify failed audits, establish fault in such failures and impose appropri­
ate sanctions.
Some of these criticisms suggest that the profession's present self- 
regulatory program for accounting firms is so unsatisfactory that some 
other form of regulation should be adopted. The National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. (the "NASD") and the National Transportation 
Safety Board (the "NTSB") have been suggested as models to be emulated 
by the accounting profession.
Because of such criticism, the Board undertook a thorough review of 
the present self-regulatory program and its history and an examination of 
the suggested alternatives to that program. This and the following chap­
ter of this special Report present some of the Board's findings and its rec­
ommendations growing out of that review.
The Profession’s Self-Regulatory Program s
In 1977, the AICPA started an ambitious new program of self-regulation 
for accounting firms. This was partially in response to the hearings con­
ducted by the late Senator Lee Metcalf, partially in response to the SEC's 
endorsement of peer reviews, and partially in response to years of discus­
sions within the accounting profession about the need for, and benefits of, 
expanded self-regulation.
The AICPA organized the Division for CPA Firms, which was di­
vided into two sections: one, the Private Companies Practice Section de­
signed for firms that do not audit clients which file reports with the SEC; 
and two, the SEC Practice Section, intended for firms that do audit clients 
which file with the SEC. Membership in either section was voluntary.
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Many firms joined both sections. The firms that audited the overwhelming 
majority of entities that filed with the SEC joined the SEC Practice Section, as 
did many firms with no SEC clients. In January 1990, the AICPA amended 
its bylaws to provide that no AICPA member could be associated with a firm 
which audited one or more ''SEC clients" unless the firm was a member of 
the SEC Practice Section. The AICPA has implemented this bylaw change by 
defining "SEC client" as an "issuer making an initial filing . . .  under the Se­
curities Act of 1933" and a "registrant that files periodic reports . . .  with the 
SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (except brokers or dealers 
registered only because of Section 15(a) of the Act) or the Investment Com­
pany Act of 1940."
The Peer Review Committee (the "PRC") and the Quality Control In­
quiry Committee (the "QCIC") are the working arms of the SEC Practice 
Section. (These self-regulatory programs are explained further in Appen­
dix B.) The PRC administers the Peer Review Program of the SEC Practice 
Section, which requires each member firm to have its quality controls and 
its compliance with them reviewed by other auditors every three years. 
The QCIC administers a program which examines the quality controls of 
firms against whom allegations of failure in connection with the audit of 
an SEC client, as well as certain other entities, have been made to find out 
whether the allegations indicate that there is a quality control deficiency.
The Peer Review Program
The triennial peer reviews required of members of the SEC Practice Section 
are conducted by teams of experienced auditors from other SEC Practice Sec­
tion member firms. Team leaders are required to attend special courses to 
qualify for peer review work. The peer review includes reviewing relevant 
materials setting forth the firm's quality control standards and practices; de­
termining whether the SEC Practice Section's membership requirements, in­
cluding such matters as continuing professional education requirements, 
have been satisfied; and examining selected audits to determine whether 
they were conducted properly and in accordance with the firm's and the pro­
fession's quality control standards. The work of the peer review teams is 
carefully reviewed by the PRC under the oversight of the Board's staff.
These reviews occasionally identify an audit that was not done in ac­
cordance with generally accepted auditing standards or financial state­
ments that were not prepared in accordance with GAAP. When such a 
problem is encountered, the firm is required to take appropriate action, 
e.g., undertake additional audit procedures or withdraw its opinion and 
advise its client to amend the financial statements to bring them into com­
pliance with GAAP.
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If quality deficiencies are found and the firm fails to take corrective 
action, the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section has the 
authority to impose sanctions. These have included: (1) corrective meas­
ures by the firm, including measures involving personnel; (2) additional 
continuing professional education; (3) accelerated or special peer reviews;
(4) admonishments, censures, or reprimands; (5) suspension from mem­
bership in the SEC Practice Section; and (6) expulsion from membership.
Effectiveness of the Peer Review Program
The Board's assessment of the Peer Review Program provides abundant 
evidence that it is a success.
■ Since 1983, the SEC's Annual Reports have stated that the SEC 
Practice Section's Peer Review Program has enhanced the quality 
and consistency of practice before the Commission.
■ Federal and state regulators and legislators are increasingly man­
dating peer reviews of auditors who undertake audit and attest en­
gagements of entities or programs that use governmental funds.
■ The Board's 1991-92 Annual Report noted that 25% of the ap­
proximately 300 firms subject to initial peer reviews in 1991 (most 
of whom joined the SEC Practice Section because of the AICPA 
bylaw change) received opinions in publicly available reports 
that the firms' quality control systems were significantly flawed. 
By contrast, 93% of the firms that had repeat reviews were re­
ported to have satisfactory quality control systems. This is strong 
evidence that the peer review process has a significant effect on 
the quality of auditing.
Avoidance of Peer Review
As noted, in 1990 the AICPA amended its bylaws to provide that no mem­
ber of the AICPA could be associated with a firm which audited one or 
more SEC clients unless the firm was a member of the SEC Practice Sec­
tion. At the present time, an overwhelming number of SEC clients are 
audited by members of the SEC Practice Section. However, there are 
some sole practitioners and small firms that continue to audit SEC clients 
without ever having had a peer review.7 Several years ago the SEC con-
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sidered a proposal that would have required that all auditors of SEC reg­
istrants —  which include the same entities referred to by the AICPA as 
SEC clients —  except certain foreign and predecessor auditors and audi­
tors involved in an  initial public offering, be included in a peer review 
program having certain minimal characteristics. The Commission's reluc­
tance to adopt this rule was based on concern that it lacked the power to 
do so.
The Board believes the Commission has the power to require SEC 
registrants to disclose appropriate information about the peer review of 
the registrant's auditor. The Board recommends that the Commission 
amend its rules to require such disclosure because it will assist in prevent­
ing situations in which the auditors of SEC registrants manage to avoid 
the peer review process.
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Recommendation II-1:
The SEC should amend its rules to require SEC registrants to dis­
close whether their auditors have had a peer review, the date of the 
most recent peer review and its results.
The Quality Control Inquiry Com m ittee Program  
The Mission of the QCIC
The QCIC performs one of the two principal functions of the SEC Practice 
Section's self-regulatory effort. Accounting firms that are members of the 
SEC Practice Section must report to the QCIC allegations of deficiencies in 
the conduct of an audit of present or former SEC clients made in civil suits 
or criminal indictments against the member firm or its personnel or in any 
public proceeding or investigation by a regulatory agency. In addition, 
members must report allegations relating to the conduct of an audit of a 
financial institution that files periodic reports under the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934, and of an audit of a subsidiary or investee of an SEC 
client if the financial statements of such an entity are presented separately 
in the parent or investor company's filing.
Further, the QCIC may request member firms to report allegations of 
deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of a non-SEC client not otherwise 
covered by the requirement if the Executive Committee of the SEC Prac­
tice Section feels there is "a significant public interest in [such alleged] 
audit failure." The QCIC may also request member firms to report allega­
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tions of deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of financial statements of a 
regulated financial institution even if it is not an SEC client or is not pub­
licly held.
Reports of allegations of audit deficiencies must be filed with the 
QCIC within 30 days of the service of the first pleading on the firm. The 
QCIC's mission is to review the allegations of audit failure against the 
member firm to determine:
(a) Whether the allegations indicate a need for corrective measures 
by the member firm with respect to the firm's quality control 
system; and
(b) Whether the facts related to the specific alleged audit failure 
indicate that changes in generally accepted auditing standards 
or quality control standards need to be considered. If the QCIC 
finds guidance on the application of GAAP inadequate, the 
QCIC reports the situation to the AICPA's Accounting 
Standards Executive Committee.
If a member firm refuses to cooperate with the QCIC or fails to take 
the corrective actions deemed reasonable and necessary by the QCIC, the 
Committee may ask the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section 
to impose sanctions.
Effectiveness of the QCIC
Since its inception, the QCIC has made numerous recommendations for 
actions to be taken by firms or the profession as a result of the QCIC re­
view of reported cases. In addition to corrective measures addressing spe­
cific quality control deficiencies, the QCIC has required special reviews, 
reviews of other relevant work, and expanded peer reviews. In addition, 
the QCIC has made referrals to appropriate AICPA technical bodies urg­
ing them to consider the need for changes in, or guidance on, professional 
standards and to the AICPA Professional Ethics Division, with a recom­
mendation for investigation of the work of specific individuals.
The accounting profession and the SEC have both said that the QCIC 
plays an important role in the self-regulatory process. The 1987 report of 
the SEC Practice Section Task Force on SIC Methodology said that the 
QCIC (previously known as the Special Investigations Committee (SIC)), 
"[performs] a very important role in enhancing the future quality of prac­
tice of member firms . . .  a role not necessarily performed by the SEC or 
the courts." The SEC's 1991 Annual Report states:
The Commission believes that the [QCIC] process provides added as­
surances, as a supplement to the SEC Practice Section peer review
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program, that major quality control deficiencies, if any, are identi­
fied and addressed in a more timely fashion. Therefore, the Com­
mission believes th at the QCIC process benefits the public interest.
The Board believes that the QCIC performs an essential function. 
The Board's goal in re-examining the QCIC process and considering alter­
native models has been to recommend measures to make it even more re­
sponsive to the public interest and the public's expectations.
Scope of the QCIC's Role
The QCIC process was never intended to determine whether an audit fail­
ure had occurred as alleged or the reasons for the failure if one did occur; 
the QCIC was not given the power to punish anyone for misconduct in 
performing an audit. When it established the QCIC, the Executive Com­
mittee of the SEC Practice Section believed that giving the QCIC such a 
mandate would duplicate existing means of determining the existence of, 
and reasons for, an audit failure, which include civil litigation brought by 
persons allegedly harmed, injunctive and disciplinary proceedings by the 
SEC, proceedings by state licensing boards and AICPA proceedings for 
ethical violations. A determination in a QCIC proceeding that there had 
been an audit failure or that specific individuals were responsible for an 
audit failure would not preclude a re-examination of those questions in 
civil litigation, an SEC proceeding or an action by state authorities or the 
AICPA.
The courts, the SEC and other regulatory and governmental bodies 
can secure evidence through subpoenaed documents and sworn testi­
mony to determine whether allegations of audit failure are valid and, if so, 
can impose appropriate sanctions on firms and individuals while protect­
ing the rights of all parties. Without such power, a self-regulatory body 
would rarely be able to make a fair and just judgment as to whether an 
audit was deficient or someone was guilty of a misdeed. Audit documen­
tary evidence alone rarely is sufficient to indicate whether an audit has 
been substandard. Working papers cannot reflect what the auditor does 
not know —  whether documents were falsified, agreements were con­
cealed or fictitious transactions were engaged in —  or whether the audi­
tor's ignorance stemmed from neglect or artful deceit by management. To 
determine what the auditor should have known —  which is necessary to 
determine culpability —  almost always requires access to client docu­
ments and records and the testimony of client personnel who are unlikely 
to testify voluntarily or to produce documents establishing their own mis­
conduct. (It is noteworthy that even a statutorily authorized self-regulator
ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC  PRACTICE SECTION’S SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAMS
20
like the NASD [see p. 23 and Appendix C] does not have the power to 
subpoena documents or witnesses.)
The Board believes these considerations are as valid now as they 
were when the QCIC was established in 1979 and that the mandate of the 
QCIC should not be expanded to include determining whether audit fail­
ures have occurred or who may have been responsible for the failure.
Consideration o f Alternative Regulatory Structures
In re-evaluating the SEC Practice Section's self-regulatory program, and par­
ticularly the QCIC portion of that program, the Board considered other 
mechanisms that might serve the public interest better than the present pro­
gram. These included the accounting regulatory structures in the United 
Kingdom and Canada and the NASD and the NTSB in the U.S. The NASD 
was chosen for study since it has been mentioned frequently as a possible 
model for a new self-regulatory structure for the accounting profession.8  The 
NTSB was chosen because its remedial objective is the same as the QCIC's 
and its means for achieving that objective most closely resembles what the 
Board believes should be an additional activity of the QCIC, namely, using 
information about past mishaps to avoid future ones.
The Board concluded that the regulatory programs that address the 
quality of audits performed in the United Kingdom and Canada have 
some of the characteristics of the SEC Practice Section's self-regulatory 
programs, but are not as comprehensive and provide no features not pre­
sent in the SEC Practice Section's programs. The Board also concluded 
that neither the NASD nor the NTSB is an appropriate model for a new ac­
counting profession self-regulatory organization or system.
The National Association of Securities Dealers
Many, including some present leaders of the profession and governmental 
observers, have suggested that a self-regulatory structure modelled on 
that of the NASD is appropriate for the accounting profession. In 1985, a 
major firm suggested such a structure and, in 1977, then-Representative John
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Moss even incorporated such a structure in legislation that did not reach 
the floor of the House. More recently, Donald H. Chapin, Assistant 
Comptroller General of th e General Accounting Office, resurfaced the 
idea.9
The Board believes that the NASD is a totally inappropriate model 
for the accounting profession.
As indicated in Appendix C, which contains a comprehensive de­
scription of the NASD, the NASD was organized pursuant to an amend­
ment to the Securities Act of 1934 at a time when the securities industry 
had no comprehensive self-regulatory organization.
The NASD performs various functions on behalf of the securities in­
dustry that are performed quite adequately on behalf of the accounting 
profession by existing entities. The NASD administers competency ex­
aminations for persons in the securities industry similar to those to which 
accountants are subject, and the NASD's registration procedures closely 
resemble the accounting profession's licensing procedures. The NASD 
has adopted and enforces "Rules of Fair Practice" which roughly corre­
spond to the Code of Professional Conduct adopted by the AICPA and 
enforced by it and the state boards.
Many who believe that an NASD-type self-regulatory organization 
would be desirable for the accounting profession seem to believe that the 
profession would benefit by a replication of the NASD's mechanisms and 
procedures for enforcing its rules, and on occasion, the federal securities 
laws. These NASD procedures provide for the investigation by NASD 
member-constituted committees of alleged misconduct by members (or 
persons associated with members) and the determination by the commit­
tees of whether there has been an infraction.10
The Board believes it would be impractical for the accounting profes­
sion to adopt this model to determine whether charges of audit failure are 
meritorious.
The typical NASD proceeding takes a few hours and rarely do the 
proceedings last longer than a day.11 Generally, the issues are fairly sim-
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ple:12 did the registered representative make false representations to cus­
tomers or misappropriate funds; did the representative sell a customer a 
security which was unsuitable or in conflict with customer instructions; 
did the firm fail to properly supervise the activities of its employees or ac­
curately maintain books and records? Usually the only evidence neces­
sary for such determinations is selective records of the NASD member, the 
testimony of the registered representative or of other employees of the 
member (or a combination of them depending on the type of case) and, in 
some cases, the records and testimony of the customer. 13 There is rarely, 
if ever, a need to secure records in the possession of third parties or the 
testimony of others.14 The NASD does not have subpoena powers; hence, 
when it does confront a situation where such additional information 
might be useful, it can only rely on the voluntary cooperation of those 
having such information.15
An adequate inquiry into an alleged audit failure, on the other hand, 
entails the examination of masses of papers, many of which are in the hands 
of the charged firm's client who might, for reasons of self protection, refuse 
to produce them. The testimony of many witnesses is usually necessary. 
Such testimony would likely include employees of the client who might, for 
a number of reasons —  not all of them honorable —  refuse to testify. The 
trial of a recent case against a major accounting firm in Arizona took eleven 
months. While this is not a typical case, episodic evidence indicates that 
most trials take several weeks, often months. There is no reason to believe 
that because a "trial" would be conducted by a self-regulatory organization, 
it would be significantly simpler or more brief than a civil trial. Even if all 
the information were available to reach a conclusion about the adequacy of 
an audit, the availability of professionals willing to participate in such pro­
longed proceedings would pose a considerable problem.
If an NASD proceeding finds that the member or an associated per­
son committed a wrong, it can order reimbursement by the respondents 
for losses and impose a penalty on the firm or associate, consisting of a
ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC  PRACTICE SECTION’S SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAMS
12 Telephone Interview with P. William Hotchkiss, Surveillance Director, NASD, and 
Norman Sue, Associate General Counsel, NASD (Sept. 29, 1992) [hereinafter 
Hotchkiss & Sue]; See generally, Ann C. Flannery, SRO Disciplinary Sanctions, 1991 
A.B.A. Litig. Sec. Subcommittee on SRO Matters at Tab A (Summarizing Types of 
NASD Disciplinary Actions for 1991).
13 Hotchkiss & Sue, supra.
14 Id.
15 See Pickard & Djinis, supra, at 1223; Sue, supra.
23
monetary fine, a suspension or a bar from engaging in the securities busi- 
ness.16 Determination of the amount of loss suffered is usually easy and 
simple and does not entail the complexities of determining, for instance, 
the losses of a class of plaintiffs. The availability of an NASD proceeding 
does not, however, preclude the member firm or the customer from seek­
ing relief in another forum if it is dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
   NASD proceeding.17 If the auditor's client sought relief initially in the 
courts, the NASD-type self-regulatory organization would still have an in­
terest in enforcing its rules and would undoubtedly commence a separate 
proceeding for the purpose of imposing a fine, a suspension or a bar 
against a member or the associate of a member charged with wrongdoing. 
Consequently, the NASD's model does nothing to mitigate the litigation 
problem, and may in fact exacerbate it.
In short, it is difficult to see what benefit would accrue to the profes­
sion, or the public, if an additional adjudicative mechanism were added to 
those which already exist: the SEC which can seek either injunctive or admin­
istrative relief and fines; the civil courts which can determine whether any­
one with proper standing to bring suit has been harmed; and the state 
disciplinary boards which have the power to bar individuals from practice 
and impose penalties on firms (as several have recently done). Redundant 
proceedings would be expensive, which would ultimately increase the cost 
of accounting services without any demonstrable benefit to the public.
The National Transportation Safety Board
The NTSB model is described in Appendix D. The Board concluded that 
the efforts of the NTSB to draw lessons from past mishaps to avoid future 
mishaps is relevant to the QCIC process and that similar procedures 
would be in the interest of both the profession and the public. Moreover, 
the NTSB's focus is remedial rather than punitive, which is consistent with 
the SEC Practice Section's objective in reviewing litigation.
The Board concluded, however, that the structure of the NTSB model 
would not be appropriate for the accounting profession. NTSB investiga­
tions are directed at events that require immediate on-site investigations
   to establish the facts.18 The accident scene is sealed so that the integrity 
and availability of relevant facts can be protected; relevant facts are then
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 gathered and validated.19 Because factual information produced from 
such investigations could not be reconstructed at a later date, immediacy 
is essential to establishing the facts.
The gathering of factual information surrounding an alleged audit 
failure does not require immediacy. The relevant audit personnel, work 
papers and client records are all accessible at a later date and the passage 
of time does not impede the inquiry.
Most important, while the NTSB investigates events whose occur­
rence is indisputable, the existence of an audit failure is almost never in­
disputable. Thus, any investigation to determine whether an audit failure 
actually occurred, which would be required before "probable cause" 
could be pursued, would duplicate the process of adjudicating civil claims 
for monetary damages and the SEC's disciplinary and injunctive proceed­
ings without additional benefit to the public.
Moreover, the NTSB's conclusions with respect to "probable cause," 
which are at the heart of the NTSB's work and which form the basis for 
the remedial measures taken as a result of its investigations, generally 
may not under the federal law be introduced in evidence in an y proceed­
ing arising from the accident.20 This provision is intended to avoid preju­
dicing the defense of those determined to have had responsibility for an 
accident against charges in other proceedings. There is at present no law 
which would prevent the conclusions with respect to the "probable cause" 
of an alleged audit failure reached by a self-regulatory body patterned on 
the NTSB from being introduced in evidence in any SEC, administrative, 
civil or criminal proceeding. Obviously, the introduction of such conclu­
sions in a proceeding could seriously damage the ability of an audit firm 
to defend itself against charges brought against it.
The Board does not believe that the NTSB structure is appropriate 
for the accounting profession even if that structure included subpoena 
power and statutory protection of evidence because it would be duplica­
tive of other proceedings. Nevertheless, the Board believes that the objec­
tive of the QCIC's procedures can be modified so that, as the 
transportation industry learns from NTSB investigations, the accounting 
profession can use information gained from past allegations of audit fail­
ures to improve the quality of future audits.
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Conclusion
The accounting profession should not pursue legislation to create an ac­
counting self-regulatory organization patterned after the NASD or a body 
modeled on the NTSB. Rather, as discussed in the following chapter of 
this Report, the Board recommends modifications to the SEC Practice Sec­
tion's membership requirements, the peer review performance standards 
and the QCIC process.
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CHAPTER III
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE 
SELF-REGULATORY PROCESS 
FOR ACCOUNTING FIRMS
This chapter recommends modifications to the SEC Practice Section's 
membership requirements, the peer review performance standards, 
and the QCIC process.
M odifications o f the Self-Regulatory  Process to Better 
Assure Against Future Audit Failures
Having considered and rejected new mechanisms to regulate the ac­counting profession, the Board turned its attention to ways of im­proving the current structure to reduce the incidence of audit 
failures.
It must be recognized that no self-regulatory process (or, for that 
matter, any governmental regulatory scheme) can ever protect the public 
completely from audit failures. Deficiencies in the conduct of an audit 
will continue to occur irrespective of how good a firm's quality control 
system is. There will always be human failures, misunderstanding of in­
structions or facts, mistakes of judgment, carelessness, failures to react to 
"red flags" and other personal failings. Managements will occasionally 
continue to deceive auditors.
Nevertheless, the Board believes that the self-regulatory process for ac­
counting firms can and must do more than it does now. The present mecha­
nisms of self-regulation do not provide the opportunity for the profession to 
learn from its mistakes or to improve its performance in one area that is in­
creasingly troublesome —  the detection of management fraud. When frauds 
are perpetrated, the entire profession must learn how the financial data were 
manipulated, how detection was initially avoided, what audit procedures 
might have discovered the irregularity and what should be done to make 
sure the same sort of mishap does not occur again.
The Board believes that the SEC Practice Section should expand its 
membership requirements and its activities in a manner that will assure 
that any lessons to be drawn from allegations of audit failure will be iden­
tified and become available to all SEC Practice Section members and to the 
profession as a whole. This can be done by having the QCIC include this
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mission in its charge and by requiring the members to report to the QCIC 
the audit guidance which in their judgment might have avoided the alle­
gations made against the firm.
Lim itations o f Present Audit Guidance
To understand the Board's recommendations, it is important to outline the 
limitations of the audit guidance presently available to the profession. By 
definition, auditing standards define, and provide guidance with respect 
to, the nature and extent of auditors' responsibilities; they should not, and 
usually do not, specify guidance on what procedures are appropriate or 
inappropriate in specific circumstances. Through its standard-setting or­
ganization, the auditing profession has produced a comprehensive set of 
auditing standards and interpretations of those standards.
What is missing are specifics: a) examples of possible fraudulent 
practices linked to precisely targeted auditing guidance and rooted in an 
analysis of allegations of audit failure; and b) the identification of auditing 
practices that require reconsideration or the development of guidance so 
they are consistently applied. This guidance could be issued in a manner 
similar to the guidance issued in the accounting area by the Financial Ac­
counting Standards Board's Emerging Issues Task Force. This guidance 
should direct attention to business, accounting and auditing practices that 
pose new or special problems for auditors.
The following are examples of situations identified through the 
analysis of QCIC cases where such guidance might be appropriate:
■ As a result of an analysis of management fraud perpetrated in 
part through the use of photocopied invoices, one auditing firm's 
policy manual instructs the auditor to check the authenticity of 
documents and to accept only original documents as corrobora­
tive audit evidence. The Board believes all firms should do this.
■ In several instances, auditors failed to discover or identify con­
cealed "bill and hold" arrangements used by the client to inap­
propriately recognize revenue. Audit staff who had examined 
shipping documents may have failed to question the location to 
which the goods were shipped. Guidance should be provided to 
the audit staff to routinely examine shipping destinations on 
sales invoices and to be alert to shipments to locations other than 
the customer's premises as a possible clue to "bill and hold" 
transactions.
■ The question of whether physical counts of retail and other in­
ventories on a test basis constitute reliable evidential matter
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE SELF-REGULATORY PROCESS
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when the client knows where the tests are going to be conducted 
needs to be addressed.
■ Auditing literature does not provide any guidance on whether 
the auditor should be responsible for opening cartons, examining 
contents, and testing inventory for adherence to technical specifi­
cations. Whether this is appropriate is debatable; that it should 
be addressed is not.
Examples like these, coming as they do from alleged audit failures, 
point to matters that the profession needs to address and resolve.
The Board believes that member firms should report to the QCIC any 
standards or guidance implications identified during their internal analy­
ses of allegedly failed audits so the QCIC can evaluate th ese findings, 
along with those identified by the QCIC's own proceedings, and see that 
appropriate guidance is published. In this way the profession can pool 
the knowledge it gains on an individual basis concerning the causes and 
circumstances of alleged audit failures and gain from it as a profession, 
just as, for instance, all airline operators and all airplane manufacturers 
learn from the investigations of the NTSB and make changes in airline 
procedures or in airplane construction reflecting the new knowledge.
In determining means of implementing this recommendation, the le­
gitimate concerns of firms with respect to the weakening of their position 
in pending litigation must be recognized. However, the Board under­
stands that some firms provide such guidance in writing to their own pro­
fessionals. Since such internal documents would, in any event, be 
subpoenable in litigation, the Board does not believe making such infor­
mation available more broadly would significantly affect a firm's litiga­
tion posture.
Notwithstanding the acknowledged value of the QCIC's present proce­
dures in quickly identifying and addressing major quality control deficien­
cies, the Board believes that measures can be taken which would better 
assure the public that firms and the self-regulatory process are taking steps to 
protect the public from future audit failures by examining past ones.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE SELF-REGULATORY PROCESS
Recommendation
The SEC Practice Section's membership requirements should be 
changed to require member firms to modify their quality control 
systems to specify that they take the following steps in response to 
allegations of deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of financial 
statements of an SEC client (or another client encompassed by the
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QCIC process) that are made in litigation against the member firm  
or its personnel, or in any public proceeding or investigation by a 
regulatory  agency:
(1) Perform a complete internal analysis of the audit; review all 
relevant work papers, correspondence and other files; 
interview members of the engagement team.
(2) Assess the capabilities of the senior audit personnel and 
determine whether the firm should monitor, reassign or 
terminate such personnel.
(3) Identify any problems with the firm 's quality control system or 
training activities.
(4) Identify any implications of the allegations relating to the 
adequacy of auditing, quality control or accounting standards.
(5) Identify any implications of the allegations relating to the 
adequacy of guidance with respect to the manner in which 
audits are conducted, including the evaluation of risks in 
audits, and relating to variations in practice and the 
interpretations of standards that should be resolved.
(6) Communicate the implications identified in items (4) and (5) in 
a structured manner to the QCIC.
Recommendation III-2:
The peer review performance standards should be amended to re­
quire peer reviewers to test firm s' compliance with these modifica­
tions to their quality control systems.
Recommendation III-3:
The QCIC procedures should be modified to require the QCIC to 
develop additional procedures to permit it, on the basis of its analy­
sis of the QCIC cases and the information reported to it under the 
expanded membership requirements discussed above, to facilitate 
the resolution of unresolved audit practice issues and to formulate, 
either by itself or in collaboration with other appropriate bodies, 
practice and guidance directions to the accounting profession in a 
retrievable format such as EITF Abstracts, which present issues 
considered by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Emerg­
ing Issues Task Force.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE SELF-REGULATORY PROCESS
30
 CHAPTER IV
IMPROVEMENTS TO STANDARDS FOR  
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND AUDIT REPORTS
This chapter discusses factors that have led to an erosion o f public 
confidence in the accounting profession, the "expectation gap," and 
provides some facts about financial statements and audits. This chapter 
also proposes recommendations for changes in standards to make financial 
statements and audit reports more understandable and useful.
Confidence in  the Profession and the “Expectation Gap”
The accounting profession has suffered a serious erosion of public confi­
dence: confidence in its standards, in the relevance of its work and in 
the financial reporting process. The reasons for this are not hard to 
identify. In some cases, not long before an entity failed, it received an audi­
tor's report giving no indication that the entity was in its latter days. How 
could it be, the intelligent and thoughtful layman asks, that the bank or other 
business was so near its demise and the auditors could not see it?
Many have also been concerned about the failure of auditors to de­
tect alleged management fraud in a number of highly publicized cases in 
which auditors have been named as defendants. The Phar-Mor, Comp­
tronix, College Bound, Cascade International and MiniScribe cases come 
quickly to mind. Many believe that a carefully planned and executed 
audit would have detected the alleged fraud.
Public confidence has been affected by the unpleasant fact that failed 
audits do occur. Audits are performed by people, and not all people are 
at their best all the time. A brilliant lawyer occasionally gives his client 
poor advice. A distinguished musician is not always at the top of his 
form. A professor known for his expository skills may deliver a flat lec­
ture. Accountants and auditors also at times fail —  no matter the extent of 
help their firms' quality control programs provide them.
Much of this erosion of confidence has been inextricably linked with 
the business and economic history of the 1980s.
LBOs, MBOs and other ingenious ways of restructuring enterprises 
resulted in complicated financial arrangements that often sowed the seeds 
of corporate disaster and taxed the skills of auditors.
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The deregulation of the financial industry led to new ways of doing 
business that stretched the ability of the accounting profession to keep up 
with the changes. New financial instruments proliferated, each presenting 
novel accounting challenges. It was difficult to determine how these as­
sets and liabilities should be measured and classified. Financial regulators 
often tolerated non-traditional financial reporting practices to help the in­
stitutions under their authority stay open. The problems were com­
pounded by the vast devaluation of property values which made 
shambles of many financial institutions' balance sheets. These develop­
ments created enormous problems for management and for accounting 
firms which were trying to value complex assets and account for transac­
tions which they had never seen before.
All of these developments created huge risks for investors, lenders 
and auditors. Not surprisingly there were more bankruptcies and busi­
ness failures than had been seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Much of the litigation referred to earlier in this Report arose out of the fail­
ures which flowed from these enormous risks taken during the 1980s by 
investors and creditors.
In many cases traditional financial reporting was unequal to the chal­
lenges posed. Often difficult accounting decisions had to be made for 
which there were no clear precedents. When many of the enterprises that 
participated in the euphoria of the "booming 80s" paid the price of their 
excesses, the auditor was usually among those charged with some in­
volvement in the failure.
The events of the 1980s widened the "expectation gap" that was identi­
fied and described in the Report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsi­
bilities (the Cohen Commission). In that report, the Commission said:
A number of surveys have been taken to determine what the pub­
lic, or knowledgeable segments of it, expect of the independent 
auditor and how they interpret the audit function. Users of finan­
cial statements expect auditors to penetrate into company affairs, 
to exert surveillance over management, and to take an active part 
in improving the quality and extent of financial disclosure. In all 
of these areas, users seem to expect more than they believe they 
are receiving from the auditors. . . . Some segments of the public 
have an erroneous impression of the auditor's role. Several expec­
tations are neither feasible to meet nor practical from a cost-effec­
21tiveness standpoint.
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Since that report, the "expectation gap" has been extensively dis­
cussed in this country, the United Kingdom, Canada and other countries 
as well. The Commission to Study the Public's Expectations of Audits (the 
Macdonald Commission), created by the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, pointed out that the "expectation gap" has a number of com­
ponents. It wisely distinguished the "reasonable" public expectations 
from the "unreasonable" ones, and the "actual" shortfall in the perform­
ance of auditors from the "perceived" shortfall.
The Board believes these distinctions are useful in analyzing the "ex­
pectation gap" and the erosion of public confidence in the profession.
For instance, the Board believes it is unreasonable for users of 
audited financial statements to expect auditors to guarantee the honesty 
and integrity of the information contained in them. Similarly, auditors 
should not be expected to warrant that management is honest, competent, 
or honorable, or that the business will prosper or continue indefinitely in 
existence.
While the Board believes that a better understanding of the limits of 
financial statements and audits can do much to close the expectation gap, 
like the Cohen Commission, the Board believes the principal obligation 
for closing the gap rests with the profession and that only improved per­
formance and an expansion of its responsibilities can close the gap to the 
extent necessary if the profession is to serve the public interest and satisfy 
the reasonable expectations of users of financial statements.
The Board believes that the users of audited financial statements 
must obtain some measure of additional assurance that the company's af­
fairs are being conducted in accordance with specified laws (to the extent 
auditors have the ability to make such judgments); that the company's in­
ternal controls meet the criteria recently adopted by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the National Commission on Fraudulent Fi­
nancial Reporting; and that management is not manipulating its financial 
reports or committing other frauds.2
The Board believes the "expectation gap" can be narrowed and pub­
lic confidence in the profession can be enhanced if:
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Recommendations 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter Cohen Commission].
22 It is interesting to note that until late in the last century detection of fraud was 
perceived by auditors, as well as their clients, as the principal purpose of an audit. 
Sikka, Puxty, Willmott & Cooper, Eliminating the Expectations Gap? 11-18 (1992).
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1. The profession improves its standards and practices, including
particularly its ability to detect management fraud; and
2. Users of audited financial statements understand the inherent 
limitations of those statements through better disclosure.
With the hope of perhaps reducing the " unreasonable" expectations 
of users of audited financial information, the Board next discusses the 
characteristics of financial statements and audits and what users can rea­
sonably expect from them. Subsequent sections of this chapter recom­
mend measures which standard setters can take to improve 
understanding of the limitations of financial statements and the account­
ant's reports thereon. Chapter V includes recommendations intended to 
improve and strengthen the profession's performance.
Some Facts About Financial Statem ents and Audits
Users of financial statements need to understand the nature of these state­
ments, the limitations of GAAP, and the significance of the auditor's opin­
ion. The "expectation gap" must be narrowed from the user's end as well 
as the auditor's. The Board offers the following brief explanation as a 
means of helping users understand the limitations of financial statements 
and audits.
Financial Statements —
are prepared under the control of the management of the re­
porting company;
are a mixture of hard data and uncertain estimates:
The accuracy of the estimates in financial statements gen­
erally depends on future events and developments.
The transactions that generate financial data and the ne­
cessity of estimates vary from simple to complex, repeti­
tive to unique, few to multitudinous, familiar to 
innovative.
depend for their usefulness and reliability on the extent and 
quality of the controls within the company and the knowl­
edge, skill and integrity of company officers and employees;
may rapidly decline in their relevance and reliability because 
of changing conditions within and without the reporting 
company or as a result of the continuing flow of transactions 
and other events that affect the company; and
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are only one of the many kinds of information necessary to 
make an informed judgment of the risk involved in an invest­
ment in, or extension of credit to, the reporting company.
An Audit in Accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards In­
cludes—
an understanding and assessment by the auditor of the re­
porting company's internal controls to assess audit risk and 
to determine the extent of audit procedures;
an assessment of the likelihood that circumstances and condi­
tions may induce officers or employees to make inappropri­
ate or misleading financial presentations;
a comparison of samples of the asserted facts in the financial 
statements with documentary and other relevant evidence of 
transactions, events and conditions;
a review of the adequacy and appropriateness of manage­
ment's assumptions about the future in arriving at estimates, 
and the appropriateness and apparent reasonableness of the 
reported estimates;
a search for material errors and irregularities in the financial 
statements; and
a responsible, professional, technical opinion on whether the 
financial statements examined present fairly, in all material 
respects, the financial position and the results of operations 
and cash flows of the entity in compliance with GAAP.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles —
are best understood as general instructions at a given point in 
time for the fair presentation of a company's financial posi­
tion and results of operations;
have been developed over time and from broad experience;
take into consideration: (1) the nature of financial statements;
(2) the difficulty of measuring financial position and the re­
sults of operations for active participants in a competitive, 
uncertain market economy; and (3) the important differences 
among enterprises, their situations, activities and conditions;
do not and cannot provide rules for measuring or disclosing 
every possible transaction in which enterprises engage or 
events to which they are subject; and
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because of the care essential in developing appropriate stand­
ards, unavoidably lag behind the innovativeness of entrepre­
neurs and those who advise them.
An Audit Cannot Assure that —
the information reported in the financial statements will lead 
to successful investments; or
the operating results and the financial condition reported in 
the audited financial statements will continue into the indefi­
nite future.
Auditors' Opinions —
are directed to whether the auditor believes that the financial 
statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial 
position and the results of operations and cash flows of the 
entity in compliance with GAAP, as of the date stated therein, 
not to the health, welfare and future success of the reporting 
enterprise.
The above summary demonstrates that the accounting and auditing 
process has inherent serious limitations. It would be desirable if such limita­
tions did not exist; nevertheless, they do and they cannot be eliminated. Nei­
ther accountants nor auditors, nor anyone else, possess the expertise that 
would permit them to eliminate the uncertainties inherent in the estimates in 
financial statements or to forecast the future with unerring accuracy.
Recognizing this, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
("FASB") should develop a brief statement to accompany all financial 
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP that would indicate clearly 
the varying degrees of reliability of the information contained in the finan­
cial statements. Many users of financial statements do not sufficiently dis­
tinguish "hard" factual assertions from estimates and value assertions 
whose accuracy is largely dependent upon future events.
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The FASB should add to its agenda a project to design a brief state­
ment explaining the limitations of financial statements. The expla­
nation should be made a part of every set of financial statements 
described as being "in accordance with generally accepted account­
ing principles."
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Criticism s o f the Current Accounting Model
Another cause of erosion in the public's confidence in accounting is the in­
creasing current criticism of the accounting model. When the FASB devel­
oped its "conceptual framework," some believed that the FASB was 
erecting a foundation of definitions oriented to the balance sheet, thus im­
plying that a balance sheet (value) approach should displace the present 
income statement approach to accounting theory. That approach gave 
proponents of value accounting new life. However, the FASB reached no 
conclusion about whether financial statement amounts should be re­
corded at historical cost or current market values, and the matter remains 
unresolved to this date.
The FASB currently does not have a comprehensive project to decide 
the possible merits of value reporting, although such reporting is being 
considered with respect to certain assets in an FASB Exposure Draft is­
sued in September 1992, "Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and 
Equity Securities." Such current FASB projects as "Accounting by Credi­
tors for Impairment of a Loan" and "Impairment of Long-Lived Assets, 
Identifiable Intangibles, and Goodwill" indicate the understandable diffi­
culty that the FASB has in departing from transaction prices in measuring 
the information reported in financial statements.
It is entirely possible that comprehensive value reporting may not be 
suitable as a substitute for transaction prices in the accounting model. 
However, as long as the matter remains unsettled, those who argue for 
this substitution are encouraged to continue their criticisms with the result 
that users of financial reports are confused. Users don't understand why 
accountants cannot make up their minds.
As long as a constant flow of criticism directed at the present ac­
counting model appears in journals and is espoused in speeches, the pub­
lic will remain confused and its confidence in accounting will decrease. 
The Board takes no position on the issue of value based versus historical 
cost based accounting. It is, however, firmly in favor of having the issue 
resolved. Accordingly, the Board urges the FASB to deal with this matter 
comprehensively and immediately.
The Board understands that the AICPA has appointed a committee 
to study the future of financial reporting to better satisfy the needs of us­
ers in the future; so has the Financial Executives Institute. The Association 
for Investment Management and Research has recently issued a position 
paper entitled "Financial Reporting in the 1990's and Beyond."
IMPROVEMENTS TO STANDARDS FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND AUDIT REPORTS
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Recommendation IV-2:
The FASB should add to its agenda a project to study comprehen­
sively the possibility of requiring the reporting of values and 
changes in values rather than historical transaction prices, either as 
a basis to propose changes to financial accounting standards or to 
explain publicly why such a change in accounting standards is im­
practical or otherwise inappropriate. In carrying out this effort, the 
FASB should consider and take into account the conclusions of the 
AICPA, the Financial Executives Institute and the Association for 
Investment Management and Research studies with respect to the 
future of financial reporting.
Risks and U ncertainties
Many believe that adequate disclosures relating to risks and uncertainties 
are envisioned by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, 
"Accounting for Contingencies," but the fact is that neither preparers nor 
auditors interpret that standard in a way that results in a clear statement 
from management describing the nature and extent of material risks and 
uncertainties. Financial statements as now prepared fall short in disclos­
ing risks and uncertainties. The AICPA's Accounting Standards Executive 
Committee has developed a draft Statement of Position on disclosures in 
financial statements about risks and uncertainties that was recently 
cleared by the FASB for public exposure.
The Board believes that this matter is of vital importance. Although, 
to the Board's knowledge, no empirical research has been done to confirm 
this, it is the Board's belief that, had this statement been in effect before 
the thrift institution debacle, some of the charges made against thrift insti­
tutions and their auditors would have been avoided.
Recommendation IV-3:
The AICPA's Accounting Standards Executive Committee should 
promptly adopt a Statement of Position providing guidance on, and 
requiring disclosure of information about, the nature of risks and
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uncertainties associated with the reporting entity's operations and 
financial condition.
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Reporting on  Sensitive Accounting Estim ates
The sufficiency and competence of evidential matter available to auditors 
to assess managements' assertions about sensitive valuation judgments 
and other estimates often do not reduce audit risk sufficiently to justify 
the degree of assurance provided in the auditor's report on historical fi­
nancial statements. Many of these valuation judgments and estimates are 
the equivalent of a financial forecast and are based primarily on condi­
tions expected to exist in the future and courses of action management ex­
pects to take. The following is an example.
The evidential matter available to the auditor to support a judgment 
about the carrying value of a financial institution's loan or equity partici­
pation in a real estate project under development is limited primarily to 
an evaluation of: (a) the developer's reputation and financial stability 
(which is usually dependent on the success of the project being consid­
ered); (b) assumptions on the marketability of the project; and (c) whether 
costs incurred to date are within budget.
If the auditor were requested to provide assurance to a third party in 
a separate financial presentation, this presentation would be cast as a fi­
nancial forecast and the auditor's report would include a caveat that the 
prospective results are dependent on assumptions that may not be 
achieved. But the same situation when included in an historical financial 
statement usually results in the auditor expressing a clean opinion on the 
financial statements, including the valuation of this very uncertain project.
This variation in auditor assurance for similar situations cannot be 
justified. The financial collapse of many financial institutions resulted di­
rectly from their equity participations in, and loans to, real estate projects. 
The auditor's assurances about the value of these projects were the same 
as the assurances provided on the carrying value of the cash account, 
rather than the assurance that would accompany a forecast.
Recommendation IV-4:
The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's standard 
report to make the prospective nature of certain accounting esti­
mates clear, including a caveat that the estimated results may not be 
achieved. This communication should not be written as a defen­
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sive retrenchment by the auditing profession, but rather as a more 
realistic and reasonable explanation of the limitation of assurance 
that can be provided on certain accounting estimates.
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In making these recommendations, the Board urges those involved 
to be ever alert to the dangers of creating expectations that cannot realisti­
cally be fulfilled by accounting and auditing. Efforts to assure that regula­
tors, financial statement users and the general public have a sound 
understanding of what accounting and auditing can and cannot do will 
do much to answer allegations that accountants and auditors have failed 
in meeting public expectations.
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CHAPTER V
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND 
STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
This chapter includes recommendations intended to improve the 
profession's performance by enhancing its capacity and willingness to 
detect fraud, strengthening professionalism and independence and by 
improving financial reporting.
This chapter is not intended to set forth an exhaustive set of recom­mendations directed at improving public confidence in the account­ing profession. There are other proposals for reform of the profession being discussed in this country and abroad which are not included here. 
Some would restructure the profession in radical ways, e.g., there is a pro­
posal by a group in the United Kingdom that companies not be permitted 
to select their auditors or negotiate their fees. The Board rejects this ex­
treme proposal as unnecessary in this country.
However, the auditing profession must aggressively strengthen its 
role and performance in a rapidly changing society. If it does that, the 
" expectation gap" will surely narrow, the risks of litigation will recede 
and public confidence in the profession will increase.
The Board emphasizes that the process of improving public confi­
dence in the profession must be ongoing. The profession should be con­
stantly alert to ways to improve its performance and financial reporting 
and should be alert to areas where attest skills can improve the reliability 
of information provided to regulators and the public. The following rec­
ommendations are a start toward the goal of improved professional per­
formance and improved financial reporting.
Recom m endations to Enhance the D etection o f  
M anagement Fraud
There has been considerable publicity about a number of recent alleged 
management frauds resulting in financial misstatements which have con­
cealed financial distress or irregularities and have contributed to substan­
tial economic losses by investors and creditors. These frauds have eroded 
the public's confidence in the audit function. Many observers question 
the value of an audit that does not detect material intentional misstate­
ments.
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No problem confronting the profession is as demanding, or as diffi­
cult to resolve, as the problem of management fraud and its detection by 
auditors. Before the turn of the century both auditors and users of 
audited financial information regarded the detection of fraud as one of the 
primary purposes of an audit. For many reasons the profession has 
moved from acceptance of that purpose to the view that its role in detect­
ing fraud is secondary to the other purposes of audits. In contrast, the 
public has continued to regard fraud detection as an important goal of the 
audit process —  and now attaches even greater importance to that goal.
Auditing standards were strengthened in 1989 to require auditors, 
when performing an audit, to assess the risk that management fraud may 
cause the financial statements to be materially misstated. Based on that 
assessment, auditors are then required to design the audit and " exercise . .  
. the proper degree of professional skepticism to achieve reasonable assur­
ance that material errors or irregularities will be detected."23 However, 
even a properly planned audit may not discover an entanglement of falsi­
fied records and documents or collusion between client personnel and 
third parties or among management and employees of the client —  all of 
which are expressly designed to mislead the auditor. Moreover, when 
performing an audit the auditor does not have the benefit of investigatory 
subpoena power to discover fraud. Nor is the auditor able to threaten 
criminal or civil proceedings or draconian prison sentences to get admis­
sions from at least some of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, the Board be­
lieves that the auditing standard, if properly implemented and followed, 
could enhance the detection of fraud. However, the Board understands 
that auditors are not consistently complying with this standard, and they 
are not sufficiently sensitive to the requirement that they exercise the 
proper degree of professional skepticism.
The Board believes there are other measures that can be taken to im­
prove performance in this difficult area. The Board believes that, to a 
greater extent than it now does, the profession must accept responsibility 
for the detection of fraud by management. The profession cannot, and it 
cannot be expected to, develop methods that will assure that every fraud, 
no matter how cleverly contrived, will be unearthed in the course of the 
audit, but it must develop means of increasing significantly the likelihood 
of detecting fraud. Adoption of the Board's recommendation to expand 
the QCIC's mission to include a more careful analysis of the factors con-
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
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(AICPA) § 316.05-.08, at 245-2 (Jan. 1992).
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tributing to failed audits should lead to improved guidance to the profes­
sion on the detection of fraud. The Board also recommends that the pro­
fession develop comprehensive guidelines to further assist auditors in 
identifying symptoms that indicate the heightened likelihood of manage­
ment fraud involving the manipulation of financial information and spec­
ify additional audit procedures when such symptoms appear. This 
undertaking should be broad in scope and include the development of 
guidance to facilitate the analysis of both financial data and non-financial 
factors that may be indicative of management fraud.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-1:
Accounting firms should assure that auditors more consistently im­
plement, and be more sensitive to the need to exercise the profes­
sional skepticism required by, the auditing standard that provides 
guidance on the auditor's responsibility to detect and report errors 
and irregularities.
Recommendation V-2:
The Auditing Standards Board, the Executive Committee of the 
SEC Practice Section or some other appropriate body should de­
velop guidelines to assist auditors in assessing the likelihood that 
management fraud which may affect financial information may be 
occurring and to specify additional auditing procedures when there 
is a heightened likelihood of management fraud.
Recom m endations to Strengthen Independence 
and Professionalism
Advocacy in Relationships with Clients
Some of the criticism levelled at auditors implies that observers of the pro­
fession see the auditor as less than objective and independent. The Board 
urges the profession to give this subject its prompt attention.
As a start, the Board suggests that auditors consider the distinction 
between client advocacy and client service. Client advocacy might best be 
understood as a matter of attitude, a willingness to serve the immediate 
interests of the client company, or its management, in any way requested 
as long as the law permits that activity. Client service means serving the
43
client company's best interests without coming into conflict with profes­
sional standards, the best interests of the audit function, or the auditor's 
best judgment.
Developing such a distinction and incorporating it into the profes­
sion's Code of Professional Conduct could do much to prevent any dimi­
nution of the auditor's independence.
Partners and staff members must be reminded constantly that the 
firm's reputation for independence is far more valuable than the fees ob­
tained from any client. When firms were smaller and the firm's senior 
management could know every partner personally, the inculcation of pro­
fessional attributes was a different matter than it is today. The sheer size 
of firms reduces the intimate knowledge that senior management once 
had of every partner. Without that knowledge, personnel evaluations be­
come less personal and more statistical.
As a practical matter, independence depends largely on judgments 
made by the audit partners on the job. If partners are judged solely, or 
even primarily, on the basis of hours and dollars billed, the audit partner 
faced with a client who is demanding advocacy is not in the best position 
to uphold the firm's reputation for independence and objectivity. Mecha­
nisms to aid and protect the partner faced with such decisions now exist 
within many firms engaged in auditing. Concurring partner review is one 
of them; requiring consultation is another. However, the Board believes 
that programs to strengthen the desire of each audit partner to protect the 
firm's independence are so important that constant review of the efficacy 
of these mechanisms, and their improvement where necessary, is a must.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-3:
The AICPA should undertake a project to sharpen further the dis­
tinction between client advocacy and client service and incorporate 
that distinction into the profession's Code of Professional Conduct. 
Individual accounting firms should constantly review their pro­
grams regarding client advocacy and client service to strengthen the 
desire of each audit partner to protect the firm's independence.
Client Advocacy with Standard Setters and Regulators
Stephen A. Zeff, a well-known accounting academic, has identified one 
form of client advocacy that he views as inappropriate —  CPA firms act­
ing as "hired guns" for their audit clients by helping them present their
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views to the FASB.24 The Board is less troubled by this service —  ghost­
writing has long been an honorable profession —  than by what some per­
ceive as more pernicious developments; namely, allowing the views of 
major clients to bias a firm's ostensibly independent response to FASB dis­
cussion memoranda, invitations to comment and exposure drafts or to in­
fluence a firm to not take a contentious and complex issue to the 
Emerging Issues Task Force because of concern about getting the "wrong" 
answer. To the extent this more subtle and covert kind of client advocacy 
exists, it damages the standard-setting process and the interpretive proc­
ess by denying those processes benefits that would otherwise be obtained 
from objective, well-reasoned and well-researched analyses of the issues. 
The mere perception that it exists damages the profession by lessening the 
regard that standard setters and the public have for auditors' inde­
pendence, objectivity, and professionalism.
A belief that clients were able to unduly influence the views of auditing 
firm partners who sat on the Accounting Principles Board contributed to that 
organization's demise and replacement with the Financial Accounting Stand­
ards Board in the early 1970s. The problem is not a new one.
However, the Board's inquiries lead it to believe that while client ad­
vocacy of the nature described does on occasion occur, it is less frequent 
than critics think. Critics must realize that considering the thoughtful 
views of clients as well as others in reaching informed professional deci­
sions about complex accounting issues is legitimate and proper; it should 
not be surprising that firms and their clients, even major clients, fre­
quently arrive at similar conclusions independently.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-4:
Accounting firms should take special care to ensure that their par­
ticipation in the standard setting process is characterized by objec­
tivity and professionalism. Standard setters and leaders of the 
profession should discuss and address the issues related to client 
advocacy in the standard setting process and establish ways of 
identifying and correcting aberrant behavior when it occurs.
24 Stephen A. Zeff, The Decline of Professionalism, 98 De Acct. NR (Netherlands) 264, 
264-67 (Jan. 1992).
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Another potential for inappropriate advocacy on accounting matters 
occurs when an auditor supports a client's accounting policy with the SEC 
staff and that policy is clearly an unreasonable application of generally ac­
cepted accounting principles or is otherwise at odds with the economic re­
ality of the underlying event or transaction. The Board has been advised 
that in most instances where this has occurred, it is typically the engage­
ment partner who has acted as the client's advocate, and has done so 
without the benefit of appropriate consultation within his or her firm. The 
advocacy in these cases represents one individual's attitude and bias. 
When this type of unprofessional behavior occurs, it should be corrected 
by the firms involved.
The Board also believes that the SEC staff should recognize that there 
are many accounting issues on which reasonable people may disagree —  
that not every policy with which the staff disagrees is necessarily an in­
stance of "creative" or "incredible" accounting or "clearly" at odds with 
the economic reality of a transaction. It is frequently in the public interest 
for clients with their auditors to discuss with the SEC staff the resolution 
of complex or unaddressed accounting issues.
The Board believes that both types of client advocacy it has described 
have the potential for reducing both the fact and appearance of objectivity 
and independence in performing audits; they also lower the perception of 
professionalism that standard setters, regulators and the public have of 
auditors. While the Board knows of no way to legislate objectivity and 
professionalism, it urges the leaders of the accounting profession to be 
constantly on the alert to this problem and to remind their colleagues peri­
odically of the importance of manifesting objectivity and professionalism.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-5:
Firm s' consultation policies and procedures should ensure that cli­
ent accounting issues are not discussed with SEC staff without the 
benefit of consultation at the appropriate level within the firm.
Recom m endations to Im prove Financial Reporting 
Determination of Accounting Treatment
In many situations, accounting standard setters have not specified the ap­
propriate method of accounting for a particular event or transaction. As a 
result, more than one accounting method appears to be available and ac­
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ceptable and at least a reasonable basis may exist for each of them. The 
views of management and the auditor may differ as to which of the per­
missible methods is preferable and management may not always be 
guided solely by a desire to provide a reliable financial report.
The Cohen Commission recognized that "deciding among alterna­
tives in the absence of specific guidance is admittedly difficult,"  but it 
went on to note that "there are many examples of auditors relying on ob­
jective bases and making such judgments with skill and competence."25 
The Macdonald Commission of Canada expressed its belief that "the audi­
tor has a particular responsibility, when faced with situations for which 
there is no clear precedent, to be satisfied that the accounting proposed is 
reasonable in relation to the substance or economic reality of the thing or 
transaction accounted for."26
In these situations, the U.S. auditing literature provides that the audi­
tor "should consider whether the substance of transactions or events dif­
fers materially from their form" and, when possible, "to account for the 
[new type of] event or transaction on the basis of its substance by selecting 
an accounting principle that appears appropriate when applied in a man­
ner similar to the application of an established principle to an analogous 
event or transaction."27
The Board believes that further emphasis on the appropriate applica­
tion of accounting policies is needed.
When the need to select an accounting treatment arises in the con­
text of an event or transaction that is new to a particular enterprise, the 
audit partner frequently, either as a matter of firm policy or voluntar­
ily, consults with accounting experts at the office, regional or national 
level, as appropriate. In fact, the SEC Practice Section requires its mem­
bers to adhere to the AICPA's quality control standards which provide, 
among other things, that "[p ]olicies and procedures for consultation 
should be established to provide the firm with reasonable assurance 
that personnel will seek assistance, to the extent required, from persons
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
25 Cohen Commission, supra, at 19.
26 Report of the Commission to Study the Public's Expectations of Auditors, Toronto: 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 58 (1988) [hereinafter Macdonald 
Report].
27 1 Codification of Professional Standards, U.S. Auditing Standards 
(AICPA) § 411.06 -.09, at 486-87 (Apr. 1992).
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having appropriate levels of knowledge, competence, judgment, and 
authority."28
Effective policies and procedures for consultation are more than a 
matter of complying with the quality control standards; they are also good 
business. Accounting firms should view the consultation process as the 
last line of defense on accounting issues that could be a cause of sub­
sequent litigation. The Board's review of cases of alleged audit failure 
studied by the QCIC in recent years indicates that in many such cases con­
sultation on accounting matters had occurred and the matters had been 
extensively considered and debated. In too many cases, however, the 
preference of client management —  influenced at least in part by objec­
tives other than producing the most reliable financial reporting possible in 
the circumstances —  nevertheless prevailed over the preference of the 
auditing or consulting partner.
Implementation of the Macdonald Commission's recommendation 
relating to "economic substance" will be difficult without the benefit of 
hindsight. But it is clear that an accountant cannot identify "economic 
substance" if those whose views are sought in the consultation process do 
not know all the relevant facts and circumstances when giving their ad­
vice. QCIC inquiries suggest that this has happened on at least several oc­
casions.
Among the membership requirements of the SEC Practice Section is 
second partner review of audits. This requirement has been strengthened 
through the years, largely at the behest of the Board. The Board is frankly 
puzzled as to why, if a truly thorough second partner review is conducted 
objectively, financial statements reflect some of the accounting judgments 
it sees as a result of its overview of the QCIC's activities.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-6:
The following recommendation of the Macdonald Commission 
should be adopted by the Auditing Standards Board in the United 
States:
When new accounting policies are adopted in response to new 
types of transactions or new kinds of assets or obligations, the
28 2 Codification of Professional Standards, Statements on Quality Control Standards
(AICPA) § 90.13, at 17,221 (May 1984).
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auditor should be satisfied that the accounting policies adopted 
properly reflect the economic substance of the transaction, asset, 
or liability in accordance with the broad theory governing pre­
sent-day financial reporting and the established concept of con­
29servatism in the face of uncertainty.
Recommendation V-7:
Peer reviewers should evaluate the consultation process by which 
specific accounting conclusions are reached, as they do now, and 
should also inquire wheth er that process leads to accounting that is 
appropriate in the circumstances. In testing compliance with the 
consultation policies and procedures in a firm, the peer review  
team should evaluate the quality of the conclusions reached.
Recommendation V-8:
The concurring partner, whose participation in an audit is a mem­
bership requirement of the SEC Practice Section, should be respon­
sible for assuring that those consulted on accounting matters are 
aware of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, including an 
understanding of the financial statements in whose context the ac­
counting policy is being considered. The concurring and consult­
ing partners should know enough about the client to ensure that all 
of the relevant facts and circumstances are marshalled, and also 
possess the increased detachment that comes from not having to 
face the client on an ongoing basis. The concurring partner should 
have the responsibility to conclude whether the accounting treat­
ment applied is consistent with the objectives of Recommendation 
V-6.
Corporate Governance
As the Treadway Commission rightly recognized, responsibility for 
fraudulent financial reporting does not rest only, or even principally, with 
the auditor. Every fraudulent financial statement for which an auditor 
has been held responsible was prepared by executives who were inten­
tionally committing a fraud, not only upon their shareholders, investors 
and the markets, but also on the auditor as well. The responsibility of cor­
porate boards and their audit committees for the integrity of management
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
29 Macdonald Report, supra, at 59.
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and financial reports should be pinpointed and reinforced and the appro­
priate authorities should adopt measures to assure that it is.
In the United Kingdom, the financial statements of a corporation are 
deemed to be the directors' statements. Because of the difficulties of 
maintaining litigation in that country against directors, directors have 
been willing to accept this responsibility. In the United States, the finan­
cial statements of an enterprise are statements of the entity. Directors may 
in some circumstances be liable for fraudulent or incorrect financial state­
ments; however, rarely have there been holdings to that effect. The SEC 
requires that a majority of the directors of an issuer sign the Form 10-K 
which includes the issuer's audited financial statements; it is doubtful, 
however, whether this exposes directors to additional liabilities.
Most major publicly held corporations today have audit committees. 
A recent Korn/Ferry  survey of 322 companies revealed that 98% of those 
responding had audit committees. The three major securities markets in 
this country —  the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Ex­
change, and NASDAQ/NMS —  all require listed companies to have audit 
committees made up entirely of outside directors or with a majority of 
outside directors.
In most corporations the responsibility for scrutiny of financial state­
ments has been delegated by boards to their audit committees. The expe­
rience of the members of the Board indicates that in too many instances 
the audit committees do not perform their duties adequately and in many 
cases do not understand their responsibilities.
The Institute of Internal Auditors has embarked on a project to iden­
tify and publicize the best audit committee practices. The Board applauds 
this and hopes that this will provide clear and comprehensive guidance to 
audit committees in discharging their oversight responsibilities. Until that 
study is completed, the Board urges all audit committees to evaluate the 
scope and adequacy of their oversight activities to ensure that they are as 
comprehensive as those recommended by the Treadway Commission. 
The matrix included as Appendix E should assist audit committees in per­
forming such an evaluation. In the Board's opinion, audit committees 
should assume defined responsibilities, as outlined in the recommenda­
tion set forth below.
To encourage audit committees or boards to fulfill such responsibili­
ties and to inform investors whether audit committees or boards perform 
those responsibilities, the SEC should require registrants to include in a 
document containing the annual financial statements a statement by the 
audit committee or the board of directors as to whether its members have
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
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reviewed the company's audited annual financial statements, have con­
ferred with management and the independent auditor concerning them, 
have received from the auditor the information required to be communi­
cated by the auditor, and believe that the financial statements are com­
plete and consistent with information known to them and reflect 
appropriate accounting principles. The Commission should reduce the 
exposure of members of the audit committee (or board) to liability by in­
dicating that the report of the audit committee (or board) will not be 
deemed to be "soliciting material" or "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The recent action of the SEC with re­
spect to compensation committee reports is a precedent for this.
The auditor should assist the audit committee and the board in under­
standing their responsibilities and the best practices to follow. The auditor 
should help the committee to assess its own performance and indicate the ar­
eas in which the committee's procedures could be strengthened. Not only 
would such auditor activity result in better financial reporting, but it would 
also reduce the danger of litigation against the auditor.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-9:
Audit committees (or the board if there is no audit committee) 
should assume the following responsibilities relating to an SEC 
registrant's preparation of annual financial statements: (a) review 
the annual financial statements; (b) confer with management and 
the independent auditor about them; (c) receive from the inde­
pendent auditor all information that the auditor is required to com­
municate under auditing standards; (d) assess whether the financial 
statements are complete and consistent with information known to 
them; and (e) assess whether the financial statements reflect appro­
priate accounting principles.
Recommendation V-10:
The SEC should require registrants to include in a document con­
taining the annual financial statements a statement by the audit 
committee (or by the board if there is no audit committee) that de­
scribes its responsibilities and tells how they were discharged. This
30 1 Codification of Professional Standards, U.S. Auditing Standards (AICPA) § 380.06
- .14, at 465-2 to 466 (July 1992).
51
disclosure should state whether the audit committee members (or, 
in the absence of an audit committee, the members of the board): 
(a) have reviewed the annual financial statements; (b) have con­
ferred with management and the independent auditor about them;
(c) have received from the independent auditor all information that 
the auditor is required to communicate under auditing standards;
(d) believe that the financial statements are complete and consistent 
with information known to them; and (e) believe that the financial 
statements reflect appropriate accounting principles.
The Audit Committee and Audit Fees
Often audit committees, in addition to recommending the election of audi­
tors to the board of directors, also undertake to negotiate the auditor's fee. 
It is believed that on many such occasions the thrust of the committee's 
endeavor is to negotiate the lowest possible fee for the entity.
While it is legitimate for an audit committee to try to get a fair bar­
gain for the entity, its overriding concern must be the quality of the audit, 
not the price charged for it. If an audit fee is negotiated at unrealistically 
low levels, it may lead to pressure on the engagement partner to reduce 
the cost of doing the audit; this may lead to "short cuts" and staff econo­
mies that adversely affect the quality of the audit. Even if the audit com­
mittee does not itself negotiate the auditor's fee, it should assure itself that 
the fee negotiated by management is fair compensation for a comprehen­
sive and competent audit and will not impair the integrity of the audit. 
Audit firms have a related obligation to refuse to perform audit services 
for fees that may compromise the integrity of the audit.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-11:
The audit committee or the board of directors should be satisfied 
that the audit fee negotiated by it or management for the entity's 
audit is sufficient to assure the entity will receive a comprehensive 
and complete audit.
Reporting on Internal Control
There is considerable enthusiasm in this country on the part of regulators 
and others for requiring corporate managements to include with their an­
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nual financial statements an evaluation of the reporting company's inter­
nal controls. The SEC has an outstanding proposal which would require 
that management include in its annual report to security holders and its 
annual report on Form 10-K, among other things, an assessment as of the 
end of the most recent fiscal year of the effectiveness of the company's 
system of internal control and a statement as to how management has re­
sponded to any significant recommendations concerning the system of in­
ternal control which its internal auditors and independent accountants 
have made. Earlier versions of proposed legislation relating to financial 
fraud detection and disclosure included a provision that would have re­
quired independent accountants to evaluate whether their clients' internal 
accounting controls reasonably ensured, among other things, that receipts 
and expenditures are recorded and accounted for properly.
Present audit standards call for a review of internal controls to assess 
audit risk and to determine the extent of audit procedures. This review of 
internal controls is neither sufficient nor intended to provide a basis for 
the evaluation of the quality of the client's system of internal control.
The difficulties that management would experience in complying 
with the SEC's proposal and that the profession would face in complying 
with the legislative proposal are gradually being removed. The Commit­
tee of Sponsoring Organizations (those which sponsored the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting) recently published Inter­
nal Control —  Integrated Framework which provides guidance on the 
components of a good system of internal controls over financial reporting. 
The AICPA's Auditing Standards Board is preparing performance and re­
porting standards for engagements providing for assurances about man­
agement assertions on internal controls over financial reporting.
When the Auditing Standards Board project is finished, it will be fea­
sible to ask management to make a statement about the company's inter­
nal controls and for the auditor to comment on that statement. The Board 
believes that the SEC should then adopt the rule it has proposed for man­
agement reports on internal controls and, in addition, require auditors to 
express an opinion on management's assertions. The Board believes that 
requiring auditors to assess management's reports on the quality of inter­
nal controls will benefit the public. First, the auditing profession's evalu­
ation of internal control systems will lead to improvements in those 
systems. Second, as long as companies' boards and top management de­
mand conformity with those systems, the improved systems will make 
management fraud and manipulation of financial reporting more difficult.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
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OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-12:
The SEC should require registrants to include in a document con­
taining the annual financial statements: (a) a report by manage­
ment on the effectiveness of the entity's internal control system 
relating to financial reporting; and (b) a report by the registrant's 
independent accountant on the entity's internal control system re­
lating to financial reporting.
In making this recommendation, the Board recognizes that this re­
quirement may set the stage for another important expectation gap unless 
the scope and limitations of internal control systems are understood.
A company with an inadequate system of internal control may have 
excellent controls because its people are all honest, intelligent, well trained 
and highly motivated. Another company with an excellent system of in­
ternal control may be defrauded because its management overrides the 
system or because a number of officers or employees conspire skillfully to 
deceive the auditor.
Internal control, and internal control over financial reporting, may be 
terms that lend themselves to misunderstanding. To many, a satisfactory 
system of internal control means that the company is well managed. 
What investors and creditors want is assurance that they will suffer no 
loss on their investment. Thus they may be inclined to believe that if a 
company is reported to be "under satisfactory control," there will be no 
unpleasant surprises for investors.
Unless independent auditors explain clearly the extent of responsi­
bility they are assuming when evaluating management's assertions about 
its internal control, there will be a serious gap between public expectations 
and audit performance.
Recommendation V-13:
The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards that re­
quire clear communication of the limits of the assurances being 
provided to third parties when auditors report on the adequacy of 
client internal control systems.
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Reporting Illegal Acts
Congressmen John Dingell, Ron Wyden and Edward Markey have rein­
troduced in the present Congress the "Financial Fraud Detection and Dis­
closure Act" which would provide a mechanism for the establishment of 
auditing procedures designed to detect illegal acts and for reporting such 
findings to the SEC if the management of the enterprise and its directors 
fail to respond to the report by the auditors of its findings. The Board be­
lieves enactment of legislation to expand beyond the requirements of the 
present auditing standards the obligations of auditors with respect to the 
detection and reporting of illegal acts is desirable. Some commentators 
have suggested that the auditing procedures called for by the bill should, 
at least initially, be established by the Auditing Standards Board, which 
presently has the responsibility for establishing auditing standards in gen­
eral. Others have suggested the bill does not provide adequate guidance 
since it does not reflect the limitations in the ability of auditors to recog­
nize illegal acts when companies are subject to such a plethora of federal, 
state and local statutes. And still others believe the legislation should not 
be limited to illegal acts which may have a material effect on financial 
statements or that reporting should be confined to the SEC. The Board 
urges that these criticisms be candidly and fully discussed between those 
in Congress sponsoring the legislation and members of the profession, 
that a good faith effort be made to resolve them in the light of the public 
interest, and that then legislation be enacted to expand the obligation of 
auditors to seek out and report illegal acts.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-14:
The accounting profession should support carefully drafted legisla­
tion requiring auditors to report to the appropriate authorities, in­
cluding the SEC, suspected illegalities discovered by the auditor in 
the course of an audit if the client's management or board of direc­
tors fails to take necessary action with respect to such suspected il­
legalities and the auditor believes that they are or may be 
significant to the entity. The profession should seek adequate 




One of the SEC Practice Section's membership requirements is that each 
professional in a member firm must receive a minimum of forty hours of 
continuing professional education each year. The requirement does not 
define the nature of the instruction that would satisfy this requirement. 
As a result, courses totally unrelated to auditing or even accounting can 
permit professionals involved in an accounting and auditing practice to 
meet the requirement. Seminars on how to manage a practice, how to pre­
pare tax returns, how to build a practice and so on now qualify.
Since this requirement was intended to improve audit quality, the 
membership requirement should require for professionals involved in an 
accounting and auditing practice that a substantial number of those hours 
must be spent in courses relating to accounting and auditing.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
Recommendation V-15:
The SEC Practice Section's membership requirements relating to 
continuing professional education should be revised to require that 
a substantial number of the required hours of continuing education 
relate to accounting and auditing.
56
CONCLUSION
The Board recognizes that at first glance it may appear that some of its rec­
ommendations, particularly those pertaining to reporting on internal con­
trols and the institution of additional measures to detect fraud, will result 
in increased audit costs and greater threats of auditor liability. The Board 
believes that, while the costs of reports by auditors on internal controls 
may entail an increase in audit expense, such expense is necessitated by 
the public interest. The additional protections afforded by such reports 
and the implementation of additional measures to detect fraud will pro­
vide substantial benefits to shareholders that should, in the long run and 
in the aggregate, substantially exceed the out-of-pocket costs associated 
with those recommendations.
As for additional exposure of auditors to liability, the Board does not 
believe its recommendations will have that result; on the contrary, the im­
plementation of its recommendations should reduce the likelihood of 
faulty audits and thereby reduce the risk of liability. Further, the recom­
mendation that auditors report on a client's internal controls is coupled 
with another recommendation that such reports clearly communicate the 
limits of the assurances provided by the reports.
The Board has sought to avoid "aspirational"  recommendations, 
such as that auditors should be more concerned with their professional­
ism, their independence, etc. Rather, it has sought to frame proposals that 
urge identified groups and entities to take specific actions to implement 
the proposals. Such an approach facilitates monitoring and measuring the 
activity of the profession and its bodies, as well as others, including Con­
gress and the SEC, in effecting the changes urged.
The Board believes that its recommendations, if adopted, will go far 
to restore public confidence in the accounting profession and will bring 
the work of the profession closer to the public's expectations of the profes­
sion. These recommendations should also result in a reduction in the pro­
fession's exposure to liability.
The challenge to any profession to improve its performance is a con­
stant and continuing one. The profession must be sensitive to changes in 
the public's expectations of it and should promptly respond to those ex­
pectations the profession can reasonably satisfy. It must be alert to 
changes in the environment in which it works —  regulatory, legal and 
economic —  so that it may take measures promptly to l ifeguard its integ­
rity and reputation. The accounting profession must be willing to extend 
the embrace of its unique attestation function to the new kinds of informa­
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tion that management, investors, creditors and others are demanding and 
are using.
In its meetings with the present and emerging leaders of the profes­
sion, the Board senses a concern for the future of the profession, but more 
importantly, also sees a willingness to confront and conquer the chal­
lenges, present and future, that face and will face the profession. The 
Board, to the extent that its mandate permits, hopes to assist the profes­
sion in meeting those challenges, for as they are met responsibly the pub­
lic interest to which the Board is committed will be well served.
CONCLUSION
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Financial responsibility among those involved in a financial failure 
or in fraudulent financial reporting should be allocated in propor­
tion to responsibility for losses suffered. Accordingly, " separate 
and proportionate" liability legislation applicable to both federal 
and state claims should be enacted by Congress. The civil liability 
provisions of RICO should be amended to eliminate treble dam­
ages in cases that arise under the federal securities laws.
Recommendation I-2:
Congress should adopt preemptive legislation to permit the prac­
tice of accountancy in a form that appropriately limits the liability 
of individual members of the firm.
TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Recommendation II-1:
The SEC should amend its rules to require SEC registrants to dis­
close whether their auditors have had a peer review, the date of the 
most recent peer review and its results.
Recommendation V-10:
The SEC should require registrants to include in a document con­
taining the annual financial statements a statement by the audit 
committee (or by the board if there is no audit committee) that de­
scribes its responsibilities and tells how they were discharged. 
This disclosure should state whether the audit committee members
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(or, in the absence of an audit committee, the members of the 
board): (a) have reviewed the annual financial statements; (b) have 
conferred with management and the independent auditor about 
them; (c) have received from the independent auditor all informa­
tion that the auditor is required to communicate under auditing 
standards; (d) believe that the financial statements are complete 
and consistent with information known to them; and (e) believe 
that the financial statements reflect appropriate accounting princi­
ples.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PU BLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
Recommendation V-12:
The SEC should require registrants to include in a document con­
taining the annual financial statements: (a) a report by manage­
ment on the effectiveness of the entity's internal control system  
relating to financial reporting; and (b) a report by the registrant's 
independent accountant on the entity's internal control system re­
lating to financial reporting.
TO THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE 
DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
Recommendation III-1:
The SEC Practice Section's membership requirements should be 
changed to require member firms to modify their quality control 
systems to specify that they take the following steps in response to 
allegations of deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of financial 
statements of an SEC client (or another client encompassed by the 
QCIC process) that are made in litigation against the member firm  
or its personnel, or in any public proceeding or investigation by a 
regulatory agency:
(1) Perform a complete internal analysis of the audit; review all 
relevant work papers, correspondence and other files; interview  
members of the engagement team.
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(2) Assess the capabilities of the senior audit personnel and de­
termine whether the firm should monitor, reassign or terminate 
such personnel.
(3) Identify any problems with the firm's quality control system 
or training activities.
(4) Identify any implications of the allegations relating to the 
adequacy of auditing, quality control or accounting standards.
(5) Identify any implications of the allegations relating to the 
adequacy of guidance with respect to the manner in which audits 
are conducted, including the evaluation of risks in audits, and re­
lating to variations in practice and the interpretations of stand­
ards that should be resolved.
(6) Communicate the implications identified in items (4) and (5) 
in a structured manner to the QCIC.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PU BLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
Recommendation III-2:
The peer review performance standards should be amended to re­
quire peer reviewers to test firms' compliance with these modifica­
tions to their quality control systems.
Recommendation III-3:
The QCIC procedures should be modified to require the QCIC to 
develop additional procedures to permit it, on the basis of its analy­
sis of the QCIC cases and the information reported to it under the 
expanded membership requirements discussed above, to facilitate 
the resolution of unresolved audit practice issues and to formulate, 
either by itself or in collaboration with other appropriate bodies, 
practice and guidance directions to the accounting profession in a 
retrievable format such as EITF Abstracts, which present issues 
considered by the FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force.
Recommendation V-7:
Peer reviewers should evaluate the consultation process by which 
specific accounting conclusions are reached, as they do now, and
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should also inquire whether that process leads to accounting that is 
appropriate in the circumstances. In testing compliance with the 
consultation policies and procedures in a firm, the peer review 
team should evaluate the quality of the conclusions reached.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
Recommendation V-15:
The SEC Practice Section's membership requirements relating to 
continuing professional education should be revised to require that 
a substantial number of the required hours of continuing education 
relate to accounting and auditing.
TO THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD
Recommendation IV-1:
The FASB should add to its agenda a project to design a brief state­
ment explaining the limitations of financial statements. The expla­
nation should be made a part of every set of financial statements 
described as being "in accordance with generally accepted account­
ing principles."
Recommendation IV-2:
The FASB should add to its agenda a project to study comprehen­
sively the possibility of requiring the reporting of values and 
changes in values rather than historical transaction prices, either as 
a basis to propose changes to financial accounting standards or to 
explain publicly why such a change in accounting standards is im­
practical or otherwise inappropriate. In carrying out this effort, 
the FASB should consider and take into account the conclusions of 
the AICPA, the Financial Executives Institute and the Association 
for Investment Management and Research studies with respect to 
the future of financial reporting.
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TO THE AICPA’S ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
Recommendation IV-3:
The AICPA's Accounting Standards Executive Committee should 
promptly adopt a Statement of Position providing guidance on, and 
requiring disclosure of information about, the nature of risks and 
uncertainties associated with the reporting entity's operations and 
financial condition.
TO THE AUDITING STANDARDS BOARD
Recommendation IV-4:
The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's standard 
report to make the prospective nature of certain accounting esti­
mates clear, including a caveat that the estimated results may not be 
achieved. This communication should not be written as a defen­
sive retrenchment by the auditing profession, but rather as a more 
realistic and reasonable explanation of the limitation of assurance 
that can be provided on certain accounting estimates.
Recommendation V-6:
The following recommendation of the Macdonald Commission 
should be adopted by the Auditing Standards Board in the United 
States:
When new accounting policies are adopted in response to new 
types of transactions or new kinds of assets or obligations, the 
auditor should be satisfied that the accounting policies adopted 
properly reflect the economic substance of the transaction, asset, 
or liability in accordance with the broad theory governing pre­
sent-day financial reporting and the established concept of con­
servatism in the face of uncertainty.
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RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
Recommendation V-13:
The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards that re­
quire clear communication of the limits of the assurances being 
provided to third parties when auditors report on the adequacy of 
client internal control systems.
TO THE AICPA AND ACCOUNTING FIRMS
Recommendation V-1:
Accounting firms should assure that auditors more consistently im­
plement, and be more sensitive to the need to exercise the profes­
sional skepticism required by, the auditing standard that provides 
guidance on the auditor's responsibility to detect and report errors 
and irregularities.
Recommendation V-2:
The Auditing Standards Board, the Executive Committee of the 
SEC Practice Section or some other appropriate body should de­
velop guidelines to assist auditors in assessing the likelihood that 
management fraud which may affect financial information may be 
occurring and to specify additional auditing procedures when there 
is a heightened likelihood of management fraud.
Recommendation V-3:
The AICPA should undertake a project to sharpen further the dis­
tinction between client advocacy and client service and incorporate 
that distinction into the profession's Code of Professional Conduct. 
Individual accounting firms should constantly review their pro­
grams regarding client advocacy and client service to strengthen the 
desire of each audit partner to protect the firm's independence.
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RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
Recommendation V-14:
The accounting profession should support carefully drafted legisla­
tion requiring auditors to report to the appropriate authorities, in­
cluding the SEC, suspected illegalities discovered by the auditor in 
the course of an audit if the client's management or board of direc­
tors fails to take necessary action with respect to such suspected il­
legalities and the auditor believes that they are or may be 
significant to the entity. The profession should seek adequate 




Accounting firms should take special care to ensure that their par­
ticipation in the standard setting process is characterized by objec­
tivity and professionalism. Standard setters and leaders of the 
profession should discuss and address the issues related to client 
advocacy in the standard setting process and establish ways of 
identifying and correcting aberrant behavior when it occurs.
Recommendation V-5:
Firms' consultation policies and procedures should ensure that cli­
ent accounting issues are not discussed with SEC staff without the 
benefit of consultation at the appropriate level within the firm.
Recommendation V-8:
The concurring partner, whose participation in an audit is a mem­
bership requirement of the SEC Practice Section, should be respon­
sible for assuring that those consulted on accounting matters are 
aware of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, including an 
understanding of the financial statements in whose context the ac­
counting policy is being considered. The concurring and consult­
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ing partners should know enough about the client to ensure that all 
of the relevant facts and circumstances are marshalled, and also 
possess the increased detachment that comes from not having to 
face the client on an ongoing basis. The concurring partner should 
have the responsibility to conclude whether the accounting treat­
ment applied is consistent with the objectives of Recommendation 
V-6.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
TO AUDIT COMMITTEES
Recommendation V-9:
Audit committees (or the board if there is no audit committee) 
should assume the following responsibilities relating to an SEC 
registrant's preparation of annual financial statements: (a) review 
the annual financial statements; (b) confer with management and 
the independent auditor about them; (c) receive from the inde­
pendent auditor all information that the auditor is required to com­
municate under auditing standards; (d) assess whether the financial 
statements are complete and consistent with information known to 
them; and (e) assess whether the financial statements reflect appro­
priate accounting principles.
Recommendation V-11:
The audit committee or the board of directors should be satisfied 
that the audit fee negotiated by it or management for the entity's 
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Appendix a
B io g r a p h ie s  o f  B o a r d  M e m b e rs
A.A . Som m er, J r ., Chairm an
A.A. Sommer, Jr., Chairman, joined the Board in 1983 and was elected 
Chairman in 1986. Mr. Sommer served as Commissioner of the SEC from 
1973 to 1976 and is currently a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of 
the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, specializing in securities law. 
He is a member of a host of legal and civic organizations and has actively 
served such organizations in various capacities, such as advisor, trustee, 
committee chairman and member. He is currently on the Board of Gover­
nors of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and was for­
merly a member of the boards of the American Bar Association and the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and a member of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board Advisory Council. He is a member 
of several boards of directors of public companies and is a frequent lec­
turer and author on corporate, securities, and accounting subjects.
Robert K. Mautz, Vice-Chairm an
Robert K. Mautz, Vice-Chairman, joined the Board in 1981. Mr. Mautz is 
Professor Emeritus of the University of Illinois and the University of 
Michigan. He is a member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, past President 
of the American Accounting Association, and former editor of the Ac­
counting Review and Accounting Horizons. He has been awarded the 
Gold Medal, the AICPA's highest honor, and the American Accounting 
Association's Outstanding Educator Award. He is a renown author of 
textbooks and technical articles. His service contributions include mem­
ber of the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure, AICPA Council and 
Board of Directors, Commission to Study the Common Body of Knowl­
edge for CPAs, Cost Accounting Standards Board, Financial Accounting 
Standards Advisory Council and Chairman of the Governmental Ac­
counting Standards Board Organization Committee.
Robert F. Froehlke
Robert F. Froehlke joined the Board in 1987. Mr. Froehlke served as As­
sistant Secretary  of Defense for Administration from 1969 to 1971, and 
was appointed Secretary of the Army in 1971. He is currently a Director
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of the Institute for Defense Analyses, in addition to being a director of sev­
eral other corporate and civic organizations. He is past president of the 
American Council of Life Insurance, past Chairman of the Board of Direc­
tors of Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S. and currently is Presi­
dent and CEO of IDS Mutual Fund Group.
Melvin R. Laird
Melvin R. Laird became a member of the Board in August 1984. Mr. 
Laird served as Representative in the U.S. Congress from Wisconsin for 
nine terms, as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973, and as Counsellor 
to the President for Domestic Affairs from 1973 through 1974. He is a 
member of several corporate boards of directors and over sixty boards of 
directors of civic organizations. He has received many honors, including 
the U.S. Medal of Freedom, the Order of Merit (Federal Republic of Ger­
many), the Legion of Honor (France), Man of the Year Awards by the 
American Cancer Society and National Association of Mental Health, the 
Military Order of the Purple Heart, and the Lasker Award for Medical Re­
search. He currently serves as Senior Counsellor for National and Interna­
tional Affairs for the Reader's Digest Association and is Chairman of the 
Board of the Communications Satellite Corporation.
Paul W. M cCracken
Paul W. McCracken joined the Board in 1985. Mr. McCracken served as a 
member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers from 1956 to 
1959 and as its Chairman from 1969 to 1971. He also served President 
Reagan as a member of the Economic Policy Advisory Board. Since 1948, 
he has been a member of the faculty of the School of Business Administra­
tion at the University of Michigan, and in 1966 was appointed the Ed­
mund Ezra Day Distinguished University Professor. He has served as a 
director on several corporate boards, authored many papers and mono­
graphs on economic and financial policy, and frequently lectured and par­
ticipated in national and international economic commissions, task forces 
and conferences.
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APPENDIX B
T h e  a c c o u n t in g  p r o f e s s io n ’s
SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAMS
The SEC Practice Section ("SECPS" or the "Section") was founded in 1977 as part of the Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") and is overseen by the 
Public Oversight Board (the "Board" or the "POB").
The Section imposes membership requirements and administers two 
fundamental programs to ensure that SEC clients are audited by account­
ing firms with adequate quality control systems: (1) peer review, through 
which Section members have their practices reviewed every three years by 
other accountants, and (2) quality control inquiry, which reviews allega­
tions of audit failure contained in litigation filed against member firms re­
lating to SEC clients and certain other entities to determine if the firms' 
quality control systems require corrective measures.
Currently, the requirements of the SECPS affect more than 105,000 
professionals at 1,214 member firms, which audit more than 14,750 SEC 
clients.
The Peer Review Process
Each member firm is required to subject its quality control system to re­
view by independent peers at least once every three years. A peer review 
evaluates: (1) whether a firm's system of quality control for its accounting 
and auditing practice is appropriately comprehensive and suitably de­
signed for its needs; (2) whether its quality control policies and proce­
dures are adequately communicated to professional personnel; (3) 
whether such policies and procedures are being complied with; and (4) 
whether the firm is complying with the membership requirements of the 
SECPS.
G eneral Considerations in a Peer Review
Administration of the Peer Review Program is the responsibility of the 
Section's Peer Review Committee. The committee establishes the stand­
ards for performing and reporting on peer reviews, enforces compliance 
by review teams with its standards, evaluates the reports on individual 
peer reviews and the suitability of action plans to correct quality control 
deficiencies submitted by reviewed firms prior to inclusion in a publicly
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accessible file, and follows up as necessary to assure that appropriate cor­
rective action is taken by firms.
The Review Team
A review team may be appointed by the Peer Review Committee, may be 
formed by a member firm engaged by the firm under review or may be 
formed by an association or state CPA society authorized to administer 
peer reviews. Only partners of SECPS member firms currently involved 
in the audit function are eligible to serve as review team captains. Mem­
bers of the review team must be independent of the reviewed firm. Recip­
rocal reviews between firms are not permitted.
Review teams must have knowledge of the type of practice to be re­
viewed, including knowledge of the specialized industries of the reviewed 
firm's clients. In the case of firms with SEC practices, review team person­
nel must possess current knowledge of SEC rules and regulations.
Perform ing the Review
A peer review has four distinct phases:
1. Study and evaluation of the firm's quality control system;
2. Review for compliance with the firm's quality control policies and 
procedures at each organizational or functional level within the 
firm, including review of workpaper files and reports for selected 
accounting and auditing engagements;
3. Review of the firm's compliance with membership requirements of 
the SECPS; and
4. Preparation of a written report and, where applicable, a letter on 
matters that require corrective action by the firm.
E xtent o f Review Team’s Tests
Careful planning is required to determine the extent of tests to be per­
formed. In planning the review, the review team obtains an under­
standing of: (a) the nature and extent of the reviewed firm's accounting 
and auditing practice, including, for example, whether the clients are in 
troubled industries or have weak financial reporting systems, which are 
factors increasing the likelihood that the financial statements of such cli­
ents may not be presented in accordance with generally accepted account­
ing principles; and (b) the design of the firm's quality control policies and 
procedures, including, for example, whether the firm's personnel are ex­
pected to use, and are trained to use, industry specific practice aids to re­
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duce the possibility that materially deficient financial statements could go 
undetected after application of the firm's quality controls.
After assessing those risks and considering the findings of the firm's 
current year's inspection (the review that the firm performs of its own 
practice), the review team determines the offices and engagements to be 
reviewed to reasonably assure that the review would detect the presence 
of deficiencies in the firm's quality controls, which, should they exist, 
would expose the firm to a serious possibility that its engagements might 
not be conducted in accordance with professional standards. The offices 
and engagements to be reviewed are a reasonable cross-section of the 
firm's practice with greater emphasis on those offices and engagements 
with the highest levels of risk.
The effectiveness of the firm's inspection program may affect the se­
lection process of the review team. For example, fewer offices and en­
gagements may have to be reviewed by the review team if tests of the 
firm's inspection indicate that the review team may appropriately com­
bine peer review and inspection findings in evaluating the design of a 
firm's quality control system and compliance therewith.
The objectives of the review of engagements are to obtain evidence 
that: (1) the reviewed firm's system of quality control met the objectives 
of quality control standards to the extent applicable to the firm's practice; 
(2) there was compliance by personnel of the firm with the firm's quality 
control policies and procedures in the performance of accounting and 
auditing services; and (3) there was compliance with the Section's mem­
bership requirements. For each engagement reviewed, the review team 
documents its conclusions as to whether anything came to its attention to 
cause it to believe that: (a) the financial statements were not presented in 
all material respects in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles; (b) the firm did not have a basis under professional standards 
for the report issued; (c) the documentation did not support the report is­
sued; or (d) the firm did not comply with its quality control policies and 
procedures in all material respects.
While the thrust of a peer review is to identify deficiencies in a firm's 
system of quality control, the process also identifies engagements deemed 
not to have been performed in accordance with professional standards. 
These are reported to the Peer Review Committee, which follows up to as­
certain that appropriate action is taken, for example, reports are recalled 
and financial statements restated or the omitted audit procedures are per­
formed to ascertain whether the financial statements should be restated.
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Reporting on  Peer Reviews 
Peer Review Report
The review team's report includes a statement of the scope of the review, a 
description of the general characteristics of a system of quality control, 
and the team's opinion —  or a disclaimer of opinion —  as to whether the 
reviewed firm's quality control system is adequate and was being com­
plied with to provide the firm with reasonable assurance of conforming 
with professional standards and the membership requirements of the Sec­
tion.
The review team's report may be either unqualified or modified. An 
unqualified report is issued when the review team is satisfied with the 
firm's quality control system and its compliance with that system and the 
membership requirements of the Section and a modified report is issued 
when the review team is not satisfied. A modified report may express a 
qualified opinion or an adverse opinion, or it may include a disclaimer of 
opinion. A qualified opinion identifies significant deficiencies in the sys­
tem or in compliance with the system. An adverse opinion indicates that 
the system is not adequate, that compliance is not adequate, or both. A 
disclaimer of opinion is issued when limitations placed on the scope of the 
peer review are so significant that the review team cannot form an overall 
opinion.
Letter of Comments
While a letter of comments always accompanies a modified report, a letter 
is also issued with unqualified reports when the review team discovers 
conditions that create more than a remote possibility of nonconformity 
with professional standards or discovers noncompliance with quality con­
trol policies and procedures or membership requirements at a level that 
requires corrective action. Letters of comment have accompanied un­
qualified reports for approximately 80% of the reviews conducted.
The reviewed firm is required to respond in writing to each item in 
the letter of comments. Its response describes actions taken or planned 
with respect to each deficiency or recommended improvement noted.
The Peer Review Committee carefully considers the deficiencies dis­
cussed in a letter of comments and the firm's response thereto as part of 
its evaluation of the appropriateness of an unqualified report or its deci­
sion whether a qualified opinion or an adverse opinion is appropriate 
when a firm is found to have significant deficiencies in its system or in its 
compliance with the system. These evaluations and discussions require
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mature and thoughtful judgment because there are no quantitative criteria 
that can be used to measure the significance of perceived deficiencies.
Peer Review Com m ittee Supervision
The committee's role in the peer review process is an active one. No re­
port is official until the committee accepts it. Every report, letter of com­
ments and accompanying response receive the attention of the committee. 
If there is an apparent inconsistency between a review team's findings in 
the peer review workpapers and its report or letter of comments, the com­
mittee pursues the matter until resolved.
In certain circumstances, the committee accepts a report only upon 
agreement by the firm in writing to stipulated conditions, such as a revisit 
by the review team captain to review the actions taken to eliminate defi­
ciencies uncovered in the review. In this manner, the committee assures 
that recommended improvements in quality are carried out.
Public Access to Peer Review Reports
Upon acceptance by the committee, the review team's report and letter of 
comments, together with the reviewed firm's response, are maintained in 
files available to the public at the AICPA offices in New York City. When 
a report is accepted only based upon a firm's agreement to a stipulated 
condition, relevant correspondence to that effect is also placed in the pub­
lic file.
POB and SEC Oversight
The staff of the Public Oversight Board (the "Board" or the "POB") di­
rectly oversees each peer review by evaluating the review team's qualifi­
cations, by reading the report, letter of comments and the firm's response, 
by reviewing selected workpapers and by participating in the meetings at 
which the committee processes the peer reviews. The staff also conducts 
direct oversight of many peer reviews of firms with SEC clients and re­
views all the peer review workpapers of firms with SEC clients that it does 
not visit. As a result of recommendations of the POB's staff, changes are 
often made in the composition of review teams, scope, report or letter of 
comments, and in the corrective measures firms are required to take. In 
addition, the Board and its staff review and comment on or propose 
changes in peer review standards and the operating procedures of the 
committee and its staff. The Board's oversight of the process has led it to 
conclude that the peer review process is effective in fostering audit quality 
among SECPS member firms.
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The SEC performs is own independent evaluation of the peer review 
process and Board oversight. The staff of the Chief Accountant inspects a 
sample of peer review workpapers and the corresponding Board over­
sight workpapers. As a result, the SEC has said that " the peer review 
process contributes significantly to improving the quality control systems 
of member firms and, therefore, should enhance the consistency and qual­
ity of practice before the Commission."
The Quality Control Inquiry Com m ittee Process 
Mission of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC)
The Executive Committee of the SECPS established the QCIC in recogni­
tion of the significant public interest that exists in determining promptly 
whether an allegation of audit failure against a firm indicates any of the 
following defects that should be promptly corrected: (1) a weakness in the 
firm's quality control system or in compliance with that system; or (2) the 
need for changes in generally accepted auditing standards, accounting 
principles, or quality control standards.
The courts and other judicial, regulatory, and governmental bodies 
have the means to determine whether allegations of audit failure are cor­
rect, and if so, to punish firms and individuals, when appropriate under 
the law. The prompt inquiry that the QCIC makes concerning reported al­
leged failures provides a means to identify and correct defects in quality 
control, a task which the courts and other bodies are ill-equipped to, and 
do not, perform.
Requirement to Report to the QCIC
Member firms are required to report to the QCIC within 30 days of service 
any litigation (including criminal indictments) against the firm or its per­
sonnel or any investigation publicly announced by a regulatory agency 
that alleges deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of the financial state­
ments or reporting thereon of a present or former SEC client or a bank or 
other lending institution client for which another regulator has been 
vested with the powers, functions and duties of the SEC.
In addition, if the committee identifies a significant public interest in 
an alleged audit failure not required to be reported, the Executive Com­
mittee of the Section may require the firm to report the matter. In this re­
gard, the QCIC screens all allegations of audit failure made by federal or 
state governmental agencies concerning the audits of financial institutions 
that are not SEC clients and requests firms to voluntarily report such mat­
ters that appear to warrant further consideration.
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Four-Phased A pproach
A task force, usually consisting of one or two committee members and 
AICPA staff persons, is assigned to each case. The task force proceeds in 
accordance with procedures specified in the document entitled, Frame­
work for the Evaluation Process of the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry 
Committee, which specifies that the QCIC conduct its procedures in four 
distinct phases:
■ Analysis of Allegations;
■ General Inquiries Concerning a Firm's Quality Control Policies 
and Procedures and Compliance Therewith;
■ In-Depth Inquiries Concerning a Firm's Quality Control Policies 
and Procedures and Compliance Therewith; and
■ Special Review.
The assigned task force continues from one phase to the next in the 
process until satisfied that there is nothing to be gained by continuing fur­
ther. That is, the evidence available is sufficient to persuade the task force 
that nothing significant is to be accomplished in the way of public protec­
tion by continuing the inquiry.
Analysis
This phase consists of reading the complaint(s), relevant financial state­
ments and other publicly available materials related to the complaint, and 
informal telephone inquiry with the firm.
General Inquiries
This phase consists of a discussion of the issues raised in the litigation that 
may have quality control implications with representatives of the firm 
and, if deemed appropriate, its peer reviewers. This phase may include 
reading peer review workpapers or internal inspection reports.
In-Depth Inquiries
This phase consists of a discussion of relevant quality control policies, 
procedures and compliance with firm personnel who have become famil­
iar with the specific engagement; reviewing firm technical manuals and 
guidance materials; and reading certain audit documentation.
It also may include timely inspection of other work performed by 
certain personnel. Under this procedure, which was adopted in 1991, the 
QCIC may require firms to perform a timely inspection of other work per­
formed by individuals who supervised an audit that resulted in allega­
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tions of audit failure to enable the committee to better assure that these in­
dividuals are complying with the firm's quality control system.
Special Review
This phase consists of reviewing relevant aspects of quality control poli­
cies and procedures and compliance therewith, following procedures 
similar to those applied in a peer review. There are five types:
■ A review of other engagements supervised by personnel who su­
pervised the allegedly faulty audit;
■ A review of selected engagements in the same industry;
■ A review of an office or offices;
■ A review of selected engagements with unique transactions or 
conditions; and
■ A review of the entire system—in effect, an accelerated peer re­
view.
The type of review performed, its scope and the reviewers selected 
are determined on a case-by-case basis.
Closed Case Summary
The QCIC closes its files on a case when it concludes that there is no need 
for action by the firm beyond whatever measures may have already been 
taken. After the committee closes a case, it prepares a "closed case sum­
mary" describing its consideration of the matter, the issues addressed, the 
procedures followed and the basis for the QCIC's conclusions. This sum­
mary  is retained until the staff of the Chief Accountant of the SEC has re­
viewed it.
POB and SEC Oversight
The POB and its staff monitor the activities of the QCIC and have unre­
stricted access to the committee's files as well as to all meetings of the 
committee and its task forces. The Board's staff reads the complaint, perti­
nent financial statements, other public documents and relevant profes­
sional literature for each reported case. The POB is represented at every 
committee meeting and its staff participates, at its discretion, in most of 
the task force meetings with representatives of firms reporting litigation.
The SEC also oversees the QCIC process and the POB oversight of it. 
For each closed case, the SEC reads the closed case summary and the 
POB's oversight work program and the SEC staff meets with the POB and
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QCIC staff to obtain further information, if necessary, about the basis for 
the committee's conclusions concerning any case.
Sanctions Against Member Firm s
The Executive Committee of the SECPS has the authority to impose sanc­
tions on member firms, ordinarily based on recommendations of the Peer 
Review Committee or the QCIC. The decision to impose a sanction is 
based on the vote of a hearing panel and, if necessary, the vote of an ap­
peals panel in accordance with rules of procedure for such proceedings. 
Experience to date has shown that the formal imposition of a sanction has 
rarely been necessary, because the objectives of the Section have been 
achieved through the voluntary cooperation of member firms in undertak­
ing remedial or corrective action when deficiencies are found.
Formal sanctions may be imposed when a member firm:
■ Refuses to abide by the membership requirements;
■ Refuses to cooperate with the Peer Review Committee or take 
corrective action recommended as a result of a peer review;
■ Refuses to cooperate with the QCIC or take corrective action rec­
ommended by that committee; or
■ Commits an egregious act for which corrective action is an inade­
quate response.
To date the only type of formal sanction that has been imposed has 
been expulsion; however, the following additional types of sanctions may 
be imposed for failure to comply with the requirements of membership:
■ Corrective measures by the firm including consideration by the 
firm of appropriate actions with respect to individual firm per­
sonnel;
■ Additional requirements for continuing professional education;
■ Accelerated or special peer reviews;
■ Admonishment, censure or reprimand;
■ Monetary fines; or
■ Suspension from membership.
Following the imposition of a sanction, a copy of the documents set­
ting forth the sanction is placed in the member firm's public file and the 
name of the member firm and the decision rendered is published in an 
AICPA membership periodical.
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SECPS M embership Requirem ents
To maximize the participation in the SECPS by firms auditing publicly 
held companies, an AICPA bylaw provides that a certified public account­
ant engaged in the practice of public accounting with a firm auditing one 
or more SEC clients may retain membership in the AICPA only if the firm 
in which he or she practices is a member of the SEC Practice Section.
An accounting firm that is a member of the Section must meet mem­
bership requirements. Compliance with them is tested in the peer review 
process. A member firm must:
■ Adhere to quality control standards established by the AICPA;
■ Have a peer review every three years, the results of which are 
available to the public;
■ Require all professionals in the firm —  not just CPAs —  to take 
part in 120 hours of continuing professional education every 
three years;
■ Periodically rotate the partner in charge of each SEC audit en­
gagement;
■ Conduct a concurring, or second partner, preissuance review on 
each SEC audit engagement;
■ Report annually to the audit committee or board of directors of 
each SEC audit client on the fees received from the client for 
management advisory services during the year under audit and 
on the types of services rendered;
■ Report to the QCIC any litigation against the firm or its person­
nel that alleges deficiencies in an audit of an SEC client or regu­
lated financial institution;
■ Report directly to the SEC the termination of any client-auditor 
relationship with an SEC client within five business days; and
■ Report annually, for the Section's public files, the number of firm 
personnel, the number of SEC clients, data about MAS fees and 
other information.
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APPENDIX C
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES 
DEALERS, INC.
I. structure
The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the "NASD") is a na­
tional securities association registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the "SEC") pursuant to the provisions of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). As such, it has been given the 
responsibility to secure compliance by its members with the rules of the 
NASD and the specific requirements of the federal securities laws, as well 
as to promote fair trade and high ethical standards for commercial con­
duct among its members. The NASD's main role is self-regulation of its 
membership through a continuous program of rulemaking, interpretation, 
and surveillance and enforcement of its rules, trade practices and ethical 
standards through its disciplinary process.
A. Membership
While membership in the NASD is voluntary, for practical purposes, 
with very narrow exceptions, it is impossible to conduct a securities 
business and deal with the public without being a member of the 
NASD. Membership is generally open to any broker or dealer 
authorized to transact an investment banking or securities business 
in the United States. The membership of the NASD is nationwide 
and includes virtually all broker-dealers.
For administrative purposes, the NASD membership is divided into 
eleven geographical districts. Members in all districts are subject to 
various fees and assessments, including an assessment on gross in­
come. These fees are a principal source of the NASD's funding.
B. Board of Governors
The management and administration of the NASD are under the di­
rection of the board of governors (the "Board"). The Board's duties 
include: (1) the determination of national policy; (2) the promulga­
tion of rules and interpretations of those rules; (3) the supervision of 
the performance of its own committees and the executive staff in the 
administration and enforcement of Board policies and the NASD 
rules; and (4) the appellate review of the NASD disciplinary actions.
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The Board is comprised of twenty-nine members, consisting of fif­
teen members elected from the securities industry, thirteen at large 
members representing issuers, members, underwriters, and insur­
ance companies, and the President of the NASD. Board members are 
elected for three-year terms. With the exception of the President, 
who serves as the spokesman for the NASD, all members of the 
Board serve without compensation. They are, however, reimbursed 
for reasonable expenses associated with meetings.
C. National Business Conduct Committee
The Board has the authority to appoint committees to assist it in con­
nection with the management of the business and affairs of the 
NASD. One such important committee is the National Business Con­
duct Committee (the "'NBCC"). The principal objective of the NBCC 
is to ensure that disciplinary actions taken by the NASD's District 
Business Conduct Committees (the "DBCC"), discussed below, are 
consistent with NASD policy, and that sanctions imposed are consis­
tent with those imposed in similar cases.
The members of the NBCC are chosen annually by the Board from 
the pool of sitting Board members; they are usually first year mem­
bers of the Board. Currently, there are eight members of the NBCC.
D. District Committees
The district committees in each of eleven geographic districts admin­
ister the NASD's affairs at the local level. Each district committee 
consists of a number of members who are active participants in the 
securities or investment banking business and are elected for three- 
year terms.
The district committees sit as the DBCCs responsible for the NASD's 
enforcement programs in the respective districts. The DBCCs' duties 
include: (1) the review of all examination reports submitted by the 
NASD examiners in its district; (2) the investigation of all complaints 
against members and persons associated with members; (3) the con­
duct of disciplinary proceedings; and (4) the issuance of decisions 
and imposition of sanctions in response to complaints filed by or 
with the DBCC's.
Typically, the full district committee serves as the DBCC. The only 
distinction between the district committees and the DBCCs is that the 
title, "District Business Conduct Committee," is used in all discipli­
nary proceedings.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC.
82
E. NASD staff
The NASD maintains a staff at offices in each of the eleven geo­
graphic districts and has an executive office in Washington, D.C. 
Each district functions as a regional office and is staffed by a district 
director, mid-level supervisors, and a complement of examiners.
The NASD district staff functions are to obtain the necessary infor­
mation for the DBCC to enable it to determine whether, in a given 
case, a disciplinary proceeding should be instituted; to administer 
the NASD's examination and inspection programs; and, once appar­
ent violations have been detected, to act in a prosecutory capacity in 
connection with the ensuing disciplinary proceeding.
II. Operations
A. Disciplinary Process
1. NASD Staff Investigations
In connection with its efforts to detect possible violations of its 
rules and the applicable provisions of the federal securities 
laws, the NASD maintains a comprehensive surveillance pro­
gram. The program includes two general categories of exami­
nations: (1) routine; and (2) special.
Of the approximately 10,000 examinations conducted by the 
NASD in 1991, 2,600 were routine examinations. All members 
of the NASD are subject to a routine examination at least once 
every three years. Members who maintain custody of client 
funds are subject to such an examination annually.
A routine examination typically includes a financial/opera­
tional review and a review of sales practices. The finan­
cial/operational portion of the examination consists of an 
inspection of: (1) the member firm's books and records; (2) con­
trols relating to supervision within the member's organization; 
and (3) various other areas of the member's business. A rou­
tine examination is not as extensive as the typical financial 
statement audit, and may have a duration anywhere from a 
day to a week depending upon the size of the firm being exam­
ined.
The sales practices portion of the routine examination varies 
depending on the types and volume of products sold by the 
member. The inspection generally focuses on the handling of
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customer accounts, including the suitability of investments, 
and whether customers are provided with adequate and timely 
information concerning their investments.
In addition to routine examinations, the NASD staff conducted 
approximately 7,400 special examinations in 1991. Special ex­
aminations generally originate from two sources: (1) customer 
complaints; and (2) reported terminations of registered repre­
sentatives "for cause" by their member employers. In each 
case the scope of the special examination is limited to obtaining 
specific information about the apparent violations alleged in 
the complaint, or the facts surrounding the dismissal of the 
registered representative. In 1991, approximately 3,700 special 
examinations were conducted in response to each of these two 
categories.
The NASD staff's role in both types of examinations is to 
gather all relevant information for review by the DBCC. The 
staff, however, has no subpoena power and may not compel 
third parties to provide information or documents. Moreover, 
the cost of the examination is borne by the NASD.
Upon completion of the examination, the staff prepares a writ­
ten report setting out the results of its inquiry and presents it to 
the DBCC. In the case of routine examinations, the NASD has 
a uniform form of report which is prepared for each product 
offered by the examinee. These reports are the basis for the 
DBCC determination as to whether a disciplinary action 
should be initiated.
2. The Disciplinary Hearing
a. Complaint and Answer
If the DBCC concludes that the member has violated the 
NASD rules or the federal securities laws, the DBCC may file 
a complaint against the member or associated person. Com­
plaints may also originate from the Board or the general pub­
lic. In 1991, approximately 1,000 formal and informal 
disciplinary actions were filed against NASD members or 
persons associated with them.
Common allegations contained in the DBCC complaints in­
clude sales practice violations such as churning or sharing in 
customer profits/losses, fraudulent or improper trade re-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC.
84
porting/practices, as well as other practices such as misap­
propriation or misuse of customer funds or securities.
The respondent must file with the DBCC a written answer to 
the charges in the complaint within twenty days from the 
date of receipt of the notice unless the time is extended by the 
DBCC. The answer is required to be on the NASD form, a 
copy of which accompanies the complaint when delivered to 
the respondent.
In order to assure the opportunity to present a defense in a 
hearing, the respondent must request a hearing before the 
DBCC at the same time the answer is submitted. If the re­
spondent fails to do so, the right to a hearing may be deemed 
to be waived. In addition, if the respondent fails to answer 
the complaint within ten days after receiving a second notice, 
the DBCC may consider the allegations of the complaint as 
admitted by the respondent and impose the appropriate pen­
alties.
b. Jurisdiction and Venue
The DBCC has original jurisdiction in handling all com­
plaints. Normally complaints are heard by the DBCC of the 
district in which the principal office of the NASD member is 
located. In cases in which the claim arose entirely or largely 
from the acts or omissions of a branch office of a broker- 
dealer, however, the case is heard by the DBCC of the district 
in which the branch office is located.
c. Pretrial Discovery
As noted above the NASD has no subpoena power. The 
DBCC may, however, prior or subsequent to a filing of a 
complaint, require a member to submit a report on the activi­
ties in question and to open its books, records, and accounts 
for inspection. The refusal of a member to supply such infor­
mation during the course of an investigation of a complaint 
may result in a violation of the NASD rules.
In addition, if the complaint concerns a customer of the re­
spondent or a financial institution, the NASD will frequently 
request the submission of information by such person, 
whether or not such party is a member of the NASD. Obvi­
ously, for non-members, responding to the request is purely 
voluntary. The NASD staff, however, has found that such re-
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quests are frequently successful so long as the respondent 
has not previously settled its dispute with the third party.
The NASD rules do not provide for any prehearing discov­
ery by the respondent. They do, however, require the staff of 
the NASD, upon request, to make available to the respondent 
a list of the witnesses, schedules, documents, and other ex­
hibits in the NASD's possession which it intends to use at the 
hearing to support the allegations in the complaint. More­
over, the respondent has the right to formally request the 
NASD staff to utilize its inspection power to obtain addi­
tional information which the respondent believes is needed 
to present its defense.
Evidence obtained by the NASD staff in connection with a 
hearing, including the NASD staff report, is for reasonable 
cause made available by the NASD to other regulatory bod­
ies, including the SEC. Private parties occasionally subpoena 
the NASD or its staff in an attempt to obtain the NASD staff 
report or other information for the purposes of private litiga­
tion. The NASD's policy has been to review each subpoena 
on a case-by-case basis. When in the opinion of the NASD 
the equities favor nondisclosure, the NASD will attempt to 
defeat the subpoena as a matter of principle.
d. The Healing
After the response to the complaint is filed and a hearing is 
requested, and assuming a settlement is not negotiated, a 
hearing before the DBCC is scheduled. A typical DBCC 
hearing has seven stages: (1) the hearing begins with an 
opening statement by the designated chairman of the panel 
setting forth the ground rules for the hearing; (2) the NASD 
staff or complainant presents an opening argument; (3) the 
respondent presents an opening argument; (4) the NASD 
staff or complainant presents its case-in-chief, followed by 
cross-examination by the respondent; (5) the respondent pre­
sents evidence, followed by cross-examination by the NASD 
staff or complainant; (6) the NASD staff or complainant pre­
sents its closing argument; and (7) the respondent presents 
its closing argument.
The complainant or the NASD has the burden of showing a 
prima facie violation of the NASD rules by the respondent.
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Accordingly the NASD staff presents its case first. If the staff 
is considered to have made a successful showing, the burden 
of going forward shifts to the respondent.
NASD hearings are much more informal than a typical court 
hearing, with the DBCC having a wide latitude as to all 
phases of the conduct of the hearing. The panel members of 
the DBCC assigned to hear the case (typically two or more 
current or former members of the DBCC) are usually not 
lawyers but industry peers of the respondent. The NASD 
staff is typically represented by NASD regional counsel, who 
take the prosecutorial role in the proceedings and present 
evidence against the respondent.
Rules of evidence relevant to court proceedings are generally 
not applicable to the DBCC hearing. For example, testimony 
in the hearings is not under oath and may be offered tele­
phonically; hearsay evidence is considered; documentary 
evidence will generally be received into evidence without 
complying with the foundational requirements applicable in 
court proceedings; and objections to the form of questions 
are rarely sustained.
Notwithstanding the lack of courtroom formalities in the 
DBCC hearing, the respondent is entitled to certain basic 
rights including: (1) the right to be heard in person and be 
represented by counsel at a hearing; (2) the right to cross-ex­
amine witnesses; and (3) the right to present a defense. In 
addition, the respondent may successfully object to the intro­
duction of evidence if cumulative or irrelevant.
The length of the DBCC hearings vary depending upon the 
complexity of the issues. Approximately eighty percent of 
the DBCC hearings involve fairly routine matters and are 
completed within four to six hours. The remaining twenty 
percent of hearings are more complex in nature, include mul­
tiple charges, and may result in a hearing lasting several 
days. Hearings extending beyond a week are extremely rare. 
Over the last four years there have been a total of approxi­
mately five multiple week hearings.
e. The Decision
Any determination reached in connection with a complaint, 
whether or not a hearing is held, must be incorporated in a
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written decision and must set forth the specific findings of 
the DBCC. In 1991, 1031 decisions were issued, compared 
with 1044 in 1990.
All decision findings must include: (1) an enumeration of the 
specific rule or rules violated; (2) an explanation of the act or 
practice which the respondent has been found to have en­
gaged in or omitted; (3) the basis upon which the findings 
are made; and (4) the penalties imposed and the reasons 
therefore. If the DBCC finds that no violations have oc­
curred, a written decision to that effect is usually prepared 
by the NASD staff in consultation with the DBCC.
3. Sanctions
The NASD has a broad range of sanctions at its disposal which 
may be imposed for each or any violation of the NASD rules or 
federal securities laws by a member or a person associated 
with a member. These sanctions include: (1) censure; (2) im­
position of a fine; (3) suspension from membership or registra­
tion; (4) expulsion from membership or revocation of 
registration; (5) suspension or bar from association with all 
members; and (6) any other sanction deemed appropriate un­
der the circumstances.
Censure is typically imposed for any violation of the NASD 
rules or federal securities laws. A censure without other addi­
tional sanctions is generally imposed for violations not requir­
ing the imposition of more severe sanctions or in situations 
where extraordinary mitigating factors exist.
Fines of any amount may be imposed upon a member or per­
son associated with a member. While the highest fine imposed 
against any individual in 1990 was $510,083, in 1991 the NASD 
levied a $2,250,000 fine against a single registered repre­
sentative and imposed fines in several cases against member 
firms and individuals in excess of $1,000,000.
The suspension of a member or a person associated with a 
member may result in that member or person being unable to 
engage in certain aspects of the securities business for a period 
of time specified in the decision. Thus, the suspension may be 
limited to only specific activities. At the end of the period of 
the suspension, the member or person is reinstated in good 
standing, assuming all fines and costs assessed with the deci­
sion have been paid.
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The expulsion of a firm from membership in the NASD and 
the bar of an individual from future association with a member 
are the most severe sanctions in the NASD's arsenal. These 
sanctions result in a member firm being excluded from the se­
curities business or a person associated with a member being 
barred from employment with a member.
In addition to the above sanctions, any member or person asso­
ciated with a member who is disciplined by the NASD may be 
assessed costs of the proceedings. These costs may include ex­
penses involved with preparing transcripts of the proceeding 
and other hearing related expenses. Moreover, the NASD fre­
quently orders the respondent to pay restitution to any injured 
third party.
Monies which the NASD actually obtains through the imposi­
tion of sanctions generally amount to an insignificant percent­
age of the NASD's total annual funding.
4. Appellate Review
a. Board of Governors
The Board has appellate jurisdiction over all decisions of the 
DBCCs. Any party aggrieved by a decision of the DBCC, as 
a matter of right, may appeal the decision to the Board. Such 
appeal must be made within fifteen days after the date of no­
tice of the decision unless the Board grants an extension. In 
1991, approximately 200 cases were appealed to the Board. 
Practically all complex cases involving multiple claims are 
appealed.
In addition, the Board has the authority, on its own motion, 
to call for review any decision issued by a DBCC. The Board 
must exercise its right of review within forty-five days from 
the date of issuance of the DBCC's decision.
The Board has designated the NBCC as the committee to ad­
minister the NASD's disciplinary program and to exercise 
appellate review authority. Consequently, every decision by 
each of the eleven districts of the NASD is reviewed by the 
NBCC. The purpose of such review is to determine whether 
the decision is consistent with NASD policy and whether the 
sanctions imposed, if any, are consistent with the seriousness
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of the violations found and with sanctions imposed in similar 
cases.
On appeal the Board, acting through the NBCC, has the 
authority to: (1) affirm, dismiss, modify or reverse dismissals 
with respect to each of the DBCC findings; (2) increase, re­
duce, modify, or cancel any disciplinary action taken by the 
DBCC; or (3) remand the case with instructions for further 
proceedings. In any event, the institution of an appeal or re­
view automatically stays any disciplinary sanction.
The Board's appellate powers are subject to limitations in 
that the Board may not consider grounds other than those 
fairly derived from the complaint as a basis to impose or af­
firm a sanction.
In connection with the review by the NBCC, the parties, if 
they participated in the DBCC proceedings, are again given 
the opportunity for a hearing and may appear by counsel or 
in person. The Board has wide flexibility concerning the con­
duct of the appeal hearing. The Board may render its deci­
sion based on the record before it and may review, with 
some limitations, evidence not previously considered but 
which the Board deems relevant to the appeal. In any event, 
the Board conducts a de novo review of the matter. Thus, a 
respondent has the opportunity at the NBCC level for a full 
review of the matter including the right to reargue his case.
Upon rendering its decision, the Board is required to provide 
written notification of the results of its decision to the re­
spondent. In addition, if the decision of the Board is not ap­
pealed to the SEC, notice of the decision is issued to the press 
and the membership of the NASD after the Board's decision 
becomes effective. If, on the other hand, the Board's decision 
is appealed to the SEC, the Board will generally delay notice 
of its decision until it receives notice of the appeal from the 
SEC, so that the fact of the appeal may also be publicized.
b. Appeal to the SEC
Any person aggrieved by disciplinary action of the NASD 
may have such action reviewed by the SEC. Approximately 
twenty percent of all DBCC decisions are ultimately ap­
pealed to the SEC. In 1991 alone, approximately thirty cases 
were appealed to the SEC, and eighteen decisions were is-
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sued. The SEC has generally been reluctant to disturb either 
the major findings of violations or imposition of sanctions, 
choosing to affirm virtually every decision of the Board.
On appeal the SEC may: (1) affirm; (2) set aside, reduce, or 
otherwise modify the findings and sanctions imposed; or (3) 
remand the case to the NASD for further proceedings. Nota­
bly, the SEC does not have the authority to increase the sanc­
tions imposed by the NASD.
An application for review of the NASD disciplinary action by 
the SEC is required to be filed by the aggrieved person 
within thirty days from the date notice of such action was re­
ceived unless a longer period is permitted by the SEC. The 
SEC, on its own motion, may also initiate review proceed­
ings.
Unless the SEC orders otherwise, the institution of review 
proceedings does not operate to stay automatically the disci­
plinary sanctions which are the subject of the review. As a 
matter of practice, the NASD does not enforce fines or sus­
pensions pending SEC review, but does seek to enforce bars 
or expulsions from membership. The aggrieved person 
must, therefore, apply to the SEC for consideration of a stay 
of bars or expulsion orders.
An application to the SEC for review does not grant a right to 
a completely new evidentiary hearing. The scope of the 
hearing is wholly within the discretion of the SEC. Typically, 
the hearing will consist solely of consideration of the record 
of the NASD and opportunity for the presentation of sup­
porting reasons to affirm, modify, or set aside the sanction, 
or to dismiss the proceeding. In certain circumstances, the 
SEC may direct that the record under review be supple­
mented with additional evidence. In any case, the SEC con­
ducts a de novo review of each matter.
In a rriving at its decision the SEC is required by statute to ap­
ply a two-tiered standard of review. In connection with the 
first tier, the SEC must review the record to determine if the 
findings of violations by the NASD are supported by the evi­
dence. If the SEC determines that the applicant did not in 
fact exhibit such conduct as found or that the conduct did not 
violate the designated rule, then the SEC must set aside the 
action taken by the NASD or remand the matter to the NASD
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for further proceedings. Conversely, if the SEC finds that the 
applicant engaged in the conduct found by the NASD and 
that such conduct violated the NASD rules designated or the 
federal securities laws, then the SEC proceeds to the second 
level of its review process. Under the second tier, if the SEC 
finds the sanction imposed by the NASD imposes any bur­
den on competition not necessary or appropriate in further­
ance of the purposes of the Exchange Act, or is excessive or 
oppressive, it may reduce, cancel, or require the remission of 
such sanction.
Any final order of the SEC is released to the press and to the 
NASD membership by the NASD, upon receipt by the NASD 
of the SEC order.
c. Appeal to the Courts
Any person aggrieved following a decision by the SEC may 
appeal the decision to the appropriate United States Court of 
Appeals. Three such appeals were filed in 1991. Such ap­
peals must be filed within sixty days after entry of the SEC's 
order.
B. Relationship to the SEC
The Exchange Act provides the SEC with the following powers over 
the NASD: (1) to review any disciplinary action imposed by the 
NASD; (2) to abrogate any rule of the NASD or require the NASD to 
adopt a rule of the SEC; (3) to disapprove any change in the rules 
proposed by the NASD; and (4) to suspend or revoke the NASD's 
registration if it fails to enforce compliance with its own rules.
The SEC has no regular program for the examination of broker-deal­
ers. The SEC, however, monitors the NASD's examination process. 
In addition, the SEC has on occasion chosen to conduct its own ex­
aminations or conduct joint examinations with the NASD upon dis­
covery of widespread or systematic problems in the industry. A 
recent example occurred in 1991, when the SEC and the NASD con­
ducted, on a cooperative basis, special examinations of the activities 
of franchise offices of certain penny-stock broker-dealers.
The SEC also receives copies of every decision rendered by the 
NASD and may call up for review any disciplinary action taken by 
the NASD. Finally, the SEC reviews annually the NASD's assess­
ment schedule to determine whether it is fair and equitable.
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APPENDIX D
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
 The National Transportation Safety Board (the "NTSB" or the " Board") is an independent agency that determines the "probable cause" of transportation accidents and promotes transportation 
safety through the issuance of safety recommendations.
The NTSB also conducts safety studies; evaluates the effectiveness of 
other government agencies and transportation safety programs; and re­
views appeals of adverse actions by the United States Department of 
Transportation involving pilot and mariner certificates and licenses.
In an attempt to prevent accidents, the NTSB develops and issues 
safety recommendations to other government agencies, industry and 
other organizations that it believes are in a position to improve transporta­
tion safety. The recommendations are always based on the NTSB's inves­
tigations and studies.
The NTSB is responsible for investigating all aviation accidents. In 
some cases, the NTSB delegates the investigation to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (the "FAA"). The NTSB, however, remains responsible 
for determining the "probable cause" of the accident.
Structure
Management
The NTSB is managed by five board members, who are assisted 
by the offices of the managing director, public affairs, congres-
31 The National Transportation Safety Board (the "NTSB") has the statutory authority 
to, among other things, make: "[P]eriodic reports to the Congress, Federal, State, 
and local agencies concerned with transportation safety, and other interested 
persons recommending and advocating meaningful responses to reduce the 
likelihood of recurrence of transportation accidents similar to those investigated by 
the Board and proposing corrective steps to make the transportation of persons as 
safe and free from risk of injury as is possible, including steps to minimize human 
injuries from transportation accidents;. . .  special studies and special investigations 
on matters pertaining to safety in transportation including human injury 
avoidance; [and]. . .  techniques and methods of accident investigation and prepare 
and publish from time to time recommended procedures for accident 
investigations___"
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sional and intergovernmental relations, safety recommendations 
and general counsel.
Board Members
The board members are full-time federal governmental employ­
ees appointed for five year staggered terms by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. No more than three board 
members may be of the same political party. Moreover, at least 
three of the five board members must have some expertise in the 
fields of accident reconstruction, safety engineering, human fac­
tors, transportation safety or transportation regulation. The du­
ties of all board members include: (1) establishing policy on 
transportation safety issues and problems, and on Board goals, 
objectives and operations; (2) reviewing and approving all acci­
dent reports and safety recommendations; and (3) presiding over 
hearings and testifying before congressional committees.
The President with the advice and consent of the Senate also des­
ignates individual board members to serve as chairman and vice 
chairman of the NTSB for two year terms. The chairman is the 
chief executive officer of the NTSB. The responsibilities of the 
chairman include: (1) appointing and supervising personnel em­
ployed by the NTSB; (2) distributing NTSB business among per­
sonnel and among administrative units of the NTSB; and (3) the 
use and expenditure of NTSB funds. The vice chairman acts as 
chairman in the event of the absence or incapacity of the chair­
man or in the case of a vacancy in the office of the chairman.
Office of Managing Director
The office of managing director implements the NTSB's pro­
grams by coordinating the day-to-day operations of the NTSB 
staff. Responsibilities include: (1) scheduling and managing the 
board members' review of major reports; and (2) providing ex­
ecutive secretarial services.
Office of Public Affairs
The office of public affairs is responsible for keeping the public 
informed on the work of the NTSB and its efforts to improve 
transportation safety. Responsibilities include: (1) answering 
questions from the public, the news media, and the transporta­
tion industry; (2) coordinating media coverage of major accident 
sites; and (3) disseminating safety information to increase public 
awareness of the NTSB's activities.
Office of Congressional & Intergovernmental Relations
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The office of congressional & intergovernmental relations keeps 
Congress and federal, state, and local government agencies in­
formed on the NTSB's efforts to improve transportation safety. 
Responsibilities include: (1) responding to oral and written in­
quiries and addressing problems and concerns raised by the 
Congress and other governmental entities; and (2) preparing tes­
timony for board member participation at Congressional hear­
ings and providing various information on legislation at the 
federal, state and local government levels.
■ Office of Safety Recommendations
The office of safety recommendations helps to ensure the NTSB 
issues appropriate and effective recommendations for enhancing 
safety in all transportation modes. This includes: (1) coordinat­
ing various safety recommendation programs; and (2) develop­
ing other programs to increase acceptance of the NTSB 
recommendations.
■ Office of General Counsel
The office of general counsel provides legal advice on policy, leg­
islation, the NTSB rules, and other legal matters. This includes: 
(1) assisting the Department of Justice in representing the NTSB 
in court proceedings; and (2) providing legal assistance and 
guidance to the above offices regarding hearings, appearances as 
witnesses and the taking of depositions.
The Party System
Investigations are conducted by the " party system." Under the party sys­
tem the NTSB staff directs the investigation, but allows all parties with a 
legitimate interest in the investigation (excluding lawyers) to participate 
in the process. For example, if the investigation involves an airplane crash 
in which engine failure is a possible cause, members of the investigative 
team may include representatives of (1) the manufacturer of the engine; 
(2) the manufacturer of the airplane; (3) the air traffic controllers union; 
and (4) the pilots union. All parties are present during each step in the in­
vestigation and receive copies of all factual information produced.
On occasion, the NTSB will contract with a third party to assist in the 
investigation. For example, if the NTSB's lab is unavailable, it may hire an 
independent lab to assist in the examination. The work of any inde­
pendent party, however, is directly supervised by the staff and observed 
by the other members of the party system.
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The Investigation
As an investigation begins for the NTSB, the staff in charge instructs all 
members of the party system (the ''Parties") that opinions and speculation 
as to the cause of the accident are not to be discussed. At the conclusion 
of each day of the on-site investigation, the Parties attend progress meet­
ings in which they are provided the opportunity to share information. 
The NTSB staff prevents the discussion from including opinions or specu­
lation as to the causes of the accident.
Prior to the conclusion of the on-site investigation, each specialized 
group within the investigation party prepares a "group report" summa­
rizing the factual information discovered, which is shared with all of the 
Parties. The NTSB monitors the content of the reports to ensure that they 
exclude any opinions or speculation as to the cause of the accident.
The analysis of the accident, the findings, the determination of prob­
able cause and the letters of recommendations resulting from the investi­
gation are prepared by the NTSB staff, and are approved by the NTSB 
board before becoming publicly available. Of these items, only a draft of 
the analysis and letters of recommendation may be shared with the Parties 
before they are finalized and made available to the public. Any member 
of the party system who disagrees with the NTSB board's analysis or rec­
ommendations may prepare a written dissent, which is made publicly 
available.
The Public Docket
The "public docket" for each investigation is stored on microfiche and 
available for public viewing at the public inquiries office of the NTSB. All 
confirmed factual information including the group reports, witness state­
ments, mechanical reports, interviews and other materials obtained from the 
investigation is placed in the public docket.32 Such information, as well as 
any other factual information resulting from the investigation, is generally 
admissible as evidence in litigation.
As noted above, the analysis of the accident, the determinations of 
probable cause and the letters of recommendation are done solely by the 
NTSB staff. This is true even when the investigation is delegated to the 
FAA. Once approved by the NTSB, the analysis, the determination of
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
32 Prior to being placed in the "public docket" this information is made available to 
the public at the scene of the accident in connection with daily news briefings 
conducted by the NTSB.
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probable cause and the recommendations become part of the Board's final 
report and are also included in the public docket. This part of the report, 
however, generally is not admissible as evidence in actions for damages.
The NTSB Reports
33Every NTSB investigation results in a final report. The reports are gen­
erally disseminated to the public through the press.3 4
The NTSB also distributes the reports to hundreds of government 
agencies, associations, manufacturers, operators and others who the Board 
believes would be in a position to prevent the recurrence of the accident.35 
Each division of the NTSB maintains a database of potential report recipi­
ents.
Effects o f the NTSB W ith Respect to Litigation
NTSB activities have been claimed to reduce litigation. The NTSB believes 
that its open process puts pressure on all parties to fix problems which 
may lead to accidents. Thus, they believe that as problems are corrected, 
accidents decrease, and litigation becomes less frequently necessary.
Uncertainty exists as to the effect of the Board's probable cause deter­
minations on the outcome of private litigation. Examples do exist when 
the party found responsible by the NTSB was exonerated by the court. 
One example is the Exxon Valdez accident. Although the NTSB report 
found that Captain Hazelwood's impairment from alcohol intoxication 
was a factor in the "probable cause" of the accident, at trial the jury acquit­
ted Hazelwood of the charge of operating a vessel while intoxicated.
NATIONAL T r a n s p o r t a t io n  s a f e t y  b o a r d
33 The NTSB report may consist of as little as a two-page summary if the investigation 
has been delegated to the FAA.
34 To provide a sense of this information, a NTSB aircraft accident report may include 
sections entitled: Factual Information; Analysis; Conclusions including Findings 
and Probable Cause; and Recommendations. The "Factual Information" may 
include the crew's composition, relevant medical factors, communication issues, 
injuries to persons and previous Board actions, among other topics. The "Analysis" 
may include information from the relevant manufacturer and various 
considerations by the NTSB.
35 For example, a report concerning a highway accident may include distribution to 
the National Association of Driver's Education Instructors and to auto insurance 
companies.
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A p p e n d i x  E
A u d it  c o m m it t e e  g u id e l in e s
The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Re­porting (Treadway Commission) contained recommendations to im­prove the effectiveness of audit committees.
This appendix includes practical tools that audit committees may 
find useful in evaluating the scope and adequacy of their oversight activi­
ties to ensure that they are as comprehensive as recommended by the 
Treadway Commission.
The first portion of the appendix is drawn from proposals contained 
in the Treadway Commission's report and the remaining portion is based 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Publi c  Ov e r s i g ht  Board
O n e  Station P la ce  
Sta m ford , C T  0 6 9 0 2
(203) 3 5 3 -5 3 0 0  
F a x : (203) 353-5311
